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ABSTRACT
This article is concerned with the question of whether the United States patent system achieves its
goal, set by policymakers, to promote innovation. The article provides a systematic review of two
bodies of literature and how each of them perceives the process and identity of the innovator. First, a
review of the development of U.S. patent system, from pre-legislation England to the U.S. federal
system, alongside the developments of the classical reasoning for property rights allocation, revealing
that as the Anglo-American patent system is rooted in the privileges system, it views innovation as
the creation of an individual inventor. Second, a review of the “evolution” of innovation production
theories, and how their focus has shifted from the individual innovator to the sole firm, focusing these
days on cross-organizational collaborations as an innovation generator. The review reveals a gap
between how innovation is actually produced and how it is viewed by the Patent Act. This lack of
congruence raises concerns regarding the ability of the Patent Act to fulfill its goal to foster innovation
and provide the appropriate incentives to that end. The article asserts that policymakers should view
innovation as the result of an intellectual effort by an ‘innovative entity,’ as opposed to a single
inventor. The article analyzes where the Patent Act falls short of incentivizing the establishment of
such an innovative entity, discussing in detail the sections regulating inventorship and ownership and
the Act's libertarian property regime. Following a conclusion that the current U.S. Patent Act does
not provide sufficient incentives required for the initiation of cross-organizational research and
development (R&D) collaboration and the establishment of the innovative entity, it calls policymakers
to address these issues. This is in order to ascertain the Act's ability to promote innovation and provide
signals to actors operating in the innovation ecosystem that cross-organizational R&D collaborations
are desired.
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THE EMERGENCE OF THE INNOVATIVE ENTITY: IS THE PATENT SYSTEM
LEFT BEHIND?
TALYA PONCHEK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Innovation is the key component in the development of nations through
technological progress. It is the driver of national and global economic well-being and
competitiveness of nations.1
The patent system is generally considered to be the primary policy tool to promote
innovation, encourage the development of new technologies, and increase the body of
human knowledge.2 It does so by providing a one-size-fits-all tool, in the sense that all
inventions, irrespective of technological field, must satisfy the same statutory
patentability criteria.3 This article is concerned with the question of achieving this
goal. The setting for this article is the United States Patent Act.
This article postulates that while innovation production theories have undergone
(and still go through) an “evolution,” the patent system may become less effective in
achieving its goal for lack of congruence between its view of the innovation process and
how innovation is really carried out.
The terms ‘innovation’ and ‘invention’ denote different stages on the innovation
production continuum. Invention is associated with the first link in the innovation
process, the generation of new ideas, conducting research and development (R&D)
activities. Innovation refers to the commercialization process of the output, leading its
distribution and diffusion to potential markets. Not every invention is commercialized
and released to the market. The opposite is true as well; not every innovation
* © Talya Ponchek 2016. Research fellow at the Haifa Center for Law and Technology (“HCLT”)
and a post-doctoral fellow at the Business Law Institute, Faculty of Law, Georg-August-Universität
Göttingen. The author thanks Prof. Oren Bracha, Prof. Gideon Parchomovsky, Dr. Mirriam
Marcowitz-Bitton, Dr. Lital Helman, Prof. Martin Adelman, the participants of the 2015 Annual
Intellectual Property Workshop at Bar Ilan University, the participants of the international
conference on The Many Faces of Innovation held by Bar Ilan University and Ono Academic College
for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. Special thanks to the Centre for
Intellectual Property Policy and Management (“CIPPM”) at Bournemouth University, especially Prof.
Maurizio Bourghi, Dr. Dinusha Mendis and Dr. Lingling Wei. The author also thanks her doctoral
thesis supervisor and head of the HCLT, Prof. Niva Elkin Koren, who inspires her to aim higher and
push the limits, and her post-doctoral supervisor Prof. Dr. Andreas Wiebe for providing her with an
exhilarating work environment and lastly, the editorial board of The John Marshall Review of
Intellectual Property Law for their outstanding editorial work. The views expressed in this article
are purely those of the author’s.
1 Maxim Kotsemir, Alexander Abroskin & Meissner Dirk, Innovation Concepts and Typology – An
Evolutionary Discussion 3 (Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 05/STI/2013),
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221299.
2 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1155, 1176 (2002). Ofer Tur-Sinai, Technological Progress and Well-Being, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
(forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2590038.
3 See id. at 1155. But cf. Sean B. Seymore, Atypical Invention, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2057,
2058–59 (2011) (citing several scholars who criticize the one-size-fits-all attribute of the patent
system).
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originates from an invention. For the purpose of the argument I wish to make in this
article, and unless stated otherwise, I postulate that the image of the innovator in this
article coincides with that of the inventor. This relies on the common view of the patent
system as an enabler of commercialization activities, 4 originating from our modern
understanding of the patent system's role.
The question of whether the patent system achieves its goal is discussed in this
article by presenting the following argument: the incentives the patent system
provides are currently directed towards the individual inventor/innovator whereas, in
light of our newfound understanding of how innovation is produced, 5 they should
address an entity, which I refer to as an ‘innovative entity.’6 To provide a basis for this
premise, this article is divided into four parts.
The article begins with Part II which includes a theoretical analysis of the
development of the innovator's image as the individual inventor through the eyes of
the patent system. The idea of an exclusive privilege
originated with the feudal custom of granting the lord of the manor the
right of holding and controlling a market or a fair. The royal grant of
such right involved the element of exclusion, although it was limited
only in the sense that no other fair or market could be held within a
distance determined by the royal grant. Within the market or fair,
however, there was free competition.7
The origin of the U.S. patent system is the historical English monopolies granted
by the monarchs. The Anglo-American patent system made its greater advances
through the unprecedented and frequent uses to which Queen Elizabeth I put her
prerogative were quite unlike any exercise of this sovereign power before. 8 Some call
these years “the birth years of the English patent system.” 9 The enactment of the 1624
Statute of Monopolies signifies the initiation of the modern patent system. 10
In those days the ‘patent system,’ which did not resemble our modern day system,
was mainly concerned with attracting artisans and craftsmen to create new industries
in England. For this reason, it was focused on providing incentives on the individual
level, focused on a specific person.11 The aim here, however, is not to cover the vast
history of the development of modern day patent system, but the theoretical analysis
is concerned with the identity of the innovator as it emerged through the years.
The notion of the individual at the center of the innovation process, in the eyes of
the law, developed in the nineteenth century with the rise of justifications for
ownership of intellectual assets, alongside civil liberties and notions of private
4 But

cf. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STANFORD L. REV. 341 (2010).
See Talya Ponchek, To Collaborate or Not to Collaborate? A Study of the Value of Innovation
from a Sectoral Perspective, 7 J. KNOWL. ECON. 43 (2016) [hereinafter Ponchek (2016)] (offering
empirical evidence to support this notion).
6 See infra Part V.
7 Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part
2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 851 (1994) [hereinafter Walterscheid (1994)].
8 Ramon A. Klitzke, Historical Background of the English Patent Law, 41 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 615, 628 (1959).
9 Id.
10 Pasquale Joseph Federico, Origin and Early History of Patents, 11 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 292, 294 (1929).
11 See infra Part II.
5
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property.12 Some even view the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution as
representing a property right bestowed upon inventors (and authors). 13 The U.S.
federal patent system was shaped by these discussions. The theories developed to
justify the inventor's ownership in his intellectual output, place emphasis on the
individual inventor. These justifications included a mix of both natural rights to
control and enjoy fruit of labor and utilitarian arguments. These arguments were
based on the same underlying concept: inventors as individuals who create new
technological innovation through their intellectual capacity. 14 The discussion of the
development of the image of the innovator in the eyes of the patent system is divided
into two: Part II discusses the development of the patent system, from pre-legislation
England to the American federal system; Part III is focused on justifications to
intellectual property rights, stemming from the discussions of property rights in the
eighteenth century. Though the development of the federal system was greatly
influenced by the discourse of property rights, this article discusses them separately
as it distinguishes between a positive discourse (Part II) and a normative discourse
(Part III).
Despite the changes the patent system has undergone over the years, one main
attribute remains constant: the patent system views innovation as an individual
endeavor. The innovator is the intellectual genius: “an individual who creates new
ideas though his intellectual capacities.” 15 American culture loves its individual
innovators: Thomas Edison, Alexander Graham Bell, Henry Ford, David Packard,
Steve Jobs, and Bill Gates were all given a place in the hall of fame of individual
inventors.16 The problem is however that innovation production theories do not share
this view.
Innovation production theories indeed once held the same notion that innovation
is conducted by a single entrepreneur, the individual innovator, who single handedly
develops her innovation. This viewpoint was shared across disciplines: sociologists,
anthropologists and economists, led by Schumpeter, at what came to be known as
12 Hans Morten Haugen, Intellectual Property Rights – Rights of Privileges?, 8 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 445, 448 (2005).
13 See infra Part II.C, n. 100.
14 Oren Bracha, Geniuses and Owners: The Construction of Inventors and the Emergence of
American Intellectual Property, in TRANSFORMATION IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR
OF PROFESSOR MORTON J. HOROWITZ 369, 374–75 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009)
[hereinafter Bracha (2009)].
15 Id. at 374.
16 Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs and Intellectual Property Law, 45 HOUS. L. REV.
1201, 1202–03 (2008); See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of
the Patent Troll, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 52, 54 (2009); Edward G. Greive, The Doctrine of Inventorship:
Its Ramifications in Patent Law, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 1342, 1342 (1966) (“The traditional inventors were
usually individuals like Thomas Edison, who alone had 1039 patents issued to him.”). But c.f., Mark
A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 745 (2012) (claiming that the
canonical story of the lone genius inventor is largely a myth, since almost all the great inventions,
which were invented by individuals, were in fact invented simultaneously or nearly simultaneously
by two or more people working independently of each other); and John Lienhard, Reflections on
Information, Biology, and Community, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 303, 309 (1995) (“We all recite the myth of
the lonely intellectual. Yet, creativity, with all its need for retreat and isolation, is not a lonely act
after all. If great inventors like Edison or Bell had one overriding form of genius, it was a genius for
forming communities of open and inventive collaborators around themselves. These scholars, too,
treasured community.”).
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Schumpeter Mark I theory. The first crack in this notion was the emergence of
Schumpeter Mark II theory, which placed the organization at the center of the
innovation system, and not the individual innovator, as research became corporate.
Since then, however, views of how innovation is produced have evolved and
changed drastically. This evolution is the result of the realization that the knowledge,
skills and resources needed to produce innovation may reside in other organizations
operating in the innovation ecosystem. Thus placing emphasis on innovation
production via collaborations and interactions. 17 Part IV provides a theoretical
analysis of the “evolution” of innovation production theories during the twentieth
century.
The evolution of innovation production theories raises concerns regarding the
patent system's role in providing incentives to invent and innovate. While innovation
production theories have adapted to the changing times, the patent system remains
largely the same, holding to a great extent the eighteenth century's views of how
innovation is produced.18 Part V discusses the concerns this incompatibility portrays.
The discussion begins with an introduction of the innovative entity. It then continues
to discuss specific sections of the Act that were meant—at least in the eyes of
Congress—to address the issue of collaboration and innovation, but fall short.19 These
"designated" sections do not provide sufficient incentives to promote the establishment
of the innovative entity and therefore the development of innovation. But the problem
does not end there. The property regime portrayed in the Act provides more
impediments on the establishment of an innovative entity.
The rights granted by the Patent Act can be conditioned by parties to a contract,
thus overcoming the barriers identified in Part V. Nevertheless, one should not easily
overlook and dismiss the significance of amending the Act, consequently providing the
necessary incentives.
This article is innovative in the sense that it adds to current literature a
theoretical analysis of 35 U.S.C. § 116 and 262, specifically with regard to innovation
production, tying it to its historical roots. The literature pertaining these sections does
so with regard to the subject of correct joint inventorship and the outcomes of omitting
an inventor's name from the patent application. 20 Though this is an important aspect
of the Act, it is a narrow one nonetheless. This article offers a broader analysis of the
Act in light of its objective to foster innovation.

17 See infra Part IV (providing a theoretical analysis of the “evolution” of innovation production
theories during the twentieth century).
18 See infra Part V (discussing the concerns this incompatibility portrays).
19 Christopher McDavid, I Want a Piece of That! How the Current Joint Inventorship Laws Deal
with Minor Contributions to Inventions, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 449, 453 (2010) (“Congress believed that
the amendment “recognize[d] the realities of modem team research”).
20 See, e.g., Rivka Monheit, The Importance of Correct Inventorship, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 191, 192
(1999); Bradley M. Krul, The ‘Four Cs’ of Joint Inventorship: A Practical Framework for Determining
Joint Inventorship, 21 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 73 (2013); Bruce M. Collins, The Significance of
Inventorship Determinations, 7 APLA Q. J. 117 (1979); Adam J. Sibley & Rodney L. Sparks, The
Difficulty of Determining Joint Inventorship, Especially with Regard to Novel Chemical Compounds
and Their Applications, 8 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 44 (2009).
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II. FOSTERING INNOVATION: FROM GUILD MONOPOLY TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
This Part aims to provide a glimpse into how the patent system came to view
innovation as being done by an individual. The following discussion moves from the
eleventh century to the current U.S. Patent Act. It does not provide a comprehensive
historical review, but instead focuses on main events leading to the development of the
modern patent system.21
Despite this article's focus on the Anglo-American patents system, the modern
patent system was not founded in England. The custom of granting limited term
monopoly privileges to inventors or importers for introducing new trade or industry
began in Italy, particularly in Venice late in the fourteenth and early in the fifteenth
century. From there it spread to Germany, France, the Netherlands, and England.
The practice of granting monopoly privileges was widely followed in many parts of
western and central Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Privileges
were granted to inventors or importers almost everywhere in Europe. Patent
privileges were merely one type in the large genus of privileges, charters, franchises,
licenses, and regulations issued by the Crown. Thus, apart from its expression in
statute form, the patent system is not chiefly an English creation. It was developing
simultaneously in several countries at about the same time, though not at the same
rate.22 As the focus here is the development of the U.S. patent system, based on
English common-law, while civil-law is the system on which the legal regime is based
in the rest of Europe, this article reviews only the development of the Anglo-American
patent system.
A. The English Ancestor
A preliminary word is in order. The reader must note that the term “patent,” as
understood prior to the establishment of the U.S. federal system, is nothing similar to
its current meaning and it is not what we now know as a “patent.”
1. Pre-Legislative History
The foundation of the patent system was laid long before the United States of
America. The foundation of the patent system as we know it today was placed as far

21 The body of literature discussing the history of the patent system is vast and wide-ranging.
See, e.g., Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J.
ECON. HISTORY 1, 3 (1950); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent
Law: Antecedents (Part 3 continued), 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 847 (1995).
22 Walterscheid (1994), supra note 7, at 689–715. See e.g., Craig Allen Nard & Andrew P. Morriss,
Constitutionalizing Patents: From Venice to Philadelphia, 2 REV. OF LAW & ECON. 2, 264, available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=585661; Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts:
American Patent Law and Administration, 1798-1836 (Part 1), 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
61 (1997) [hereinafter Walterscheid (1997)].
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as the medieval guild practices in Europe.23 At this time it was recognized that the
Crown had the right to grant any part of the common property of the nation to
individuals provided that such grant would benefit the public. 24 Acting upon this idea
of promoting the public interests the British monarchs granted these privileges. 25
English monarchs, since the fourteenth century, made periodic attempts to aid the
development of new industries through importation mainly, and local inventions.26
The concept of group as opposed to individual monopoly had long been known and
practiced in England. The first attempts to protect knowledge was done by the craft
guilds. They recognized the value of their craft knowledge and made considerable
efforts to control and limit its availability within the membership of the guild. 27 And
so guilds operating in England were granted group monopolies.
During the eleventh century the guild system made its appearance in England. It
flourished in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and continued through the
eighteenth century, though declined.28 By the fifteenth century many guilds had
already developed a proprietary view of their knowledge resources.29 The guilds'
asserted that they owned the craft knowledge and practices of their occupation. This
exhibits the recognition of value that could be gained from the organized control of
valuable knowledge on behalf of the group members who stood to gain from its
exploitation.
The guilds were actually a group monopolies sanctioned by the state and were
never granted to one person.30 With the growth of towns in the eleventh century,
“merchants began to protect themselves by forming guilds, obtaining by charter the
sole right of regulating trade within a town. They could thus monopolize all trade
including, not only the sale of goods, but also all manufacturing.”31 These group
monopolies were “necessarily municipal or regional in character”32 and were apparent
throughout Europe.33 Private monopolies, however, were still to come. The guilds set
the stage for the subsequent private monopoly patents. It was an easy step from the

23 Kenneth L. Sokoloff & B. Zorina Khan, Intellectual Property Institutions in the United States:
Early
Development
&
Comparative
Perspective,
available
at:
http://www.dklevine.com/archive/sokoloff-kahn.pdf.
24 Federico, supra note 10; Klitzke, supra note 8, at 622 (“[T]he right of the Crown to grant
privileges for new trades was recognized very early . . . [T]he right of the English sovereign to grant
privileges was of ancient origin and was derived from the early common law”).
25 Federico, supra note 10, at 293.
26 Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents
(Part 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 850 (1994) ]hereinafter Walterscheid (1994)].
27 Susan Sell & Christopher May, Moments in Law: Contestation and Settlement in the History of
Intellectual Property, 8 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 467, 475 (2001).
28 Walterscheid (1994), supra note 26, at 851.
29 Pamela O. Long, Invention, Authorship, Intellectual Property and the Origin of Patents: Notes
Toward a Conceptual History, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 846, 875 (1991) (arguing that it is within medieval
cities the attitude developed that craft processes constituted intangible property with commercial
value subject to conditions of ownership).
30 Klitzke, supra note 8, at 622.
31 Id. at 621-22.
32 Walterscheid (1994), supra note 7, at 852.
33 E. Wyndham Hulme, The History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative and at Common
Law, 12 L. Q. REV. 141, 141-42 (1896).
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guild monopolies to the private monopolies, once the sovereign had fully established
his power over the regulation of trade.34
The purpose of the group monopolies granted to guilds was to prevent non-guild
members from competing with the members. Within the guild “there was free
competition in selling and manufacturing but competition from outsiders was
prevented. Trade was carefully regulated and price maintenance was practiced,”
though sometimes the monopoly power was abused.35 Though a monopoly was
provided to the guild as one body—recognizing it is comprised of various individual
craftsmen—the competition within the guilds allowed those individuals to still
compete between themselves and maintain the individual nature of craftsmanship.
The shift from group monopoly to individual monopoly was twofold. First, these
guilds had frequently abused their monopolistic powers.36 Within the guild there was
free competition in selling and manufacturing but competition from outsiders was
prevented. Second, the power of the guilds declined as the industry was becoming
national rather than local.37 Starting as early as the fourteenth century, “[T]he Crown
had made periodic attempts to aid the development of new industries mainly by
importation . . . The primary mechanism used to encourage the development of
national manufactures and industries was the use of the royal prerogative to grant
certain privileges by means of letters patent” to individuals “who would introduce new
industries,”38 also referred to as “letters patent of monopoly for invention.”39 The term
“invention” meant the establishment of a new trade or industry, either through
importation or through actual discovery of new technology. It was not required that
the grantee be the “inventor” in the modem context and frequently was not. “There
was a requirement for novelty, but only in the sense that the ‘invention’ had not been
worked in England” before.40 These were a subdivision of “letters patent for
privileges,” or simply “letters patent” granted to induce the grantee to engage in a
business that would benefit the public. 41 “Letters patent” was the name of official
documents by which all kinds of monopolies were granted, both legal and illegal. 42
Klitzke, supra note 8, at 622-23.
Id. at 622; Federico, Federico supra note 10, at 296.
36 Walterscheid (1994), supra note 7, at 851.
37 Federico, supra note 10, at 296.
38 Walterscheid (1994), supra note 7, at 850. This letter of patent was not given to the inventor,
but to residents who were importing technologies discovered elsewhere. See Sokoloff & Khan, supra
note 23, at 3 (this practice was widespread in most European nations of that time); Walterscheid
(1994), supra note 7, at 855-56 (Elizabethan monopoly patents were primarily granted for the
importation of new industry); Federico, supra note 10, at 293.
39 Walterscheid (1994), supra note 7, at 850.
40 Id. at 870.
41 Giles S. Rich, Are Letters Patent Grants of Monopoly?, 15 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 239, 241 (1993).
42 Rich, supra note 41, at 247-48 (“In England, over three centuries ago, the word “monopoly” was
associated in the public mind with privileges of sole selling, to be sure, but more often than not
with the sole selling of things that had previously been in the public domain. Such privileges deprived
the public of some of the freedom and liberty that it had enjoyed before and hurt where it hurt most,
in the pocketbook . . . If the public had the same thing before, the monopoly is illegal; if it got the thing
from the patentee, the monopoly is legal.”). These illegal monopolies were referred to as “Odious
Monopolies.” They were a common practice during Queen Elizabeth I and her successor King James
I reign. See Walterscheid (1994), supra note 7, at 853-54, 862-71. Some view all types of monopolies
as illegal. See EDWARD COKE, 3 INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 181 (1797). However, he did
not discuss patents nor inventions. Id.
34
35
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They were an administrative channel for conferring privileges and exercising royal
power.43 These “patents” are very different then what we know today as the meaning
of words like “patents” often changes with time and place. 44 These “letters patent”
were very different than modern days patents. 45 Letters patent of monopoly for
invention were just another form of public royal grants like any other royal grants (e.g.,
land, offices or honors), aimed to entice foreign artisans. 46 They were not granted to
the inventor but to the importers of new trades or crafts, the manufactures, and did
not allow the selling of goods.47 The widen and duration of these grants were not
constant and were at the sole discretion of the Crown. Some grants encompassed a
wide range of rights, while others were narrower.48
The term “letters patent” literally referred to the official document used in such
grants: an open letter (literae patentes) addressed to the public that announced the
privileges conferred by the Crown upon a specific individual. 49 But in the middle of
the sixteenth century, during the Tudor dynasty reign, “instead of issuing letters
patent to foreign artisans” to benefit the public, “the Crown began to negotiate in secret
for the purpose of attracting skilled” foreign artisans into the Crown's service,50 issuing
closed letters (literae clausae).51 The importance of the this practice to the discussion
here is the fact that this practice further escalated during the reign of Queen Elizabeth
I leading to the enactment of 1623 Statute of Monopolies.
In the early days, however, the privileges granted did not involve any monopoly
“but instead were directed to such things as offering the [Crown's] protection and
franchises to those introducing the new trade or craft”, and were known as “letters of
protection.”52 They lacked any element of privilege of exclusivity or a monopoly
bestowed on the artisan. These letters of protection provided the Crown's protection to
foreign artisans to induce them to come to England and a license to practice their trade
in spite often being in conflict with the charters of a guild.53
43 Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600-1836: How Patents Became Rights and Why
We Should Care, 38 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 177, 184 (2004) [hereinafter Bracha (2004)].
44 Rich, supra note 41, at 241.
45 See Ranon A. Klitzke, Historical Background of the English Patent Law, 41 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 615, 637-38 (1959) (discussing these differences).
46 Bracha (2005), supra note 43, at 184. Some letters patents for invention were actually granted
to individuals that could be considered inventors under our modern understanding of “invention,” only
to invite them to operate in England, though this was not the purpose. The first patent for a newly
invented process was granted to John of Shiedame and his company in 1440. He was invited to
introduce a method of making salt on a scale which was never attempted before in England. See
Hulme, supra note 33, at 143.
47 Walterscheid (1994), supra note 7, at 870.
48 Federico, supra note 10, at 298 (“The nature and conditions of each grant varied greatly, some
specifically reserved the rights of the users of old machines, others covered not oily the instant
invention but also all subsequent improvements, some required the employment of a number of
apprentices and, in the case of foreign patentees, the employment of native apprentices was
stipulated. There was no fixed period for the duration of the patent, the first few granted were for ten
years but later six, seven, twenty, twenty-one and thirty years were common”).
49 Bracha (2004), supra note 43, at 184.
50 Federico, supra note 10, at 293; Walterscheid (1994), supra note 7, at 850.
51 Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American Intellectual Property, 9
(2005)
(S.J.D.
dissertation,
Harvard
Law
School),
available
at
https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/obracha/dissertation/ [hereinafter Bracha (2005)].
52 Walterscheid (1994), supra note 7, at 850.
53 Klitzke, supra note 45, at 623-24.
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Letters patent were a creature of royal prerogative and in the sole discretion of
the monarch. The monarch granted all letters patent as “a matter of grace and
favour.”54 The grant process was based on case-specific policy decisions of the monarch
to confer particular privileges on a certain individual in order to promote some
economic, social, or political goal.55 While some general policy may have applied with
regard to certain grant applications, each grant was an independent decision based on
the exercise of specific discretion and a weighing of the interests involved. “Each grant
created its own tailored set” of the public benefits a grantee was expected to supply
and the privileges bestowed.56 The process of issuing such letters patent included an
examination if such privilege is for the public good. 57 The monopoly bestowed upon
the artisan, “as opposed to a mere privilege, while also obtainable from the sovereign,
was in derogation of the common right of freedom of trade and could not be granted
without some consideration” of the public good.58
Queen Elizabeth I grants were attacked most vigorously. As she “acceded to the
English throne, the country was still far behind in industrial arts in comparison to the
continental Europe.59 She continued granting letters patent in order to further develop
the national industry by importing skilled artisans and entrepreneurs to introduce
new industries in England.60 The Queen flagrantly misused her prerogative by
granting monopolies in industries which were already established in England.”61 This
practice led to the legislation of the first Anglo-American patent law.62
2. The Statute of Monopolies of 1623
The previous section discusses the abuse of guilds' monopolistic powers which
resulted in their disappearance from commerce life in England. However, the guilds
Bracha (2004), supra note 43, at 186.
George Ramsey, The Historical Background of Patents, 18 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 6,
6-9 (1936).
56 Bracha (2004), supra note 43, at 185-86.
57 Federico, supra note 10, at 293.
58 Klitzke, supra note 45, at 625-26.
59 Id. at 632.
60 Id. at 633. See, e.g., CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE
ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1660-1800, 11 (1988) (“[A]cquisition of superior Continental technology was
the predominant motive for the issue of patents under the guidance of Elizabeth I’s chief minister,
William Cecil, later Lord Burghley”).
61 Klitzke, supra note 45, at 633.
62 Such grants were attacked most vigorously in the Parliament. See Klitzke, supra note 45, at
633. Though outside the scope of this article it is worth mentioning one of the prominent antecedents
that led to the enactment of the Statute, that is, the case of Darcy v. Allen, 77 Eng. Rep 1620 (K.B.
1603) (known also as the Case of Monopolies) [hereinafter Case of Monopolies]. Edward Darcy held a
patent for the sole importing, making, and selling of playing-cards. A London haberdasher, Allen,
infringed the patent and Darcy brought suit. The court held that the queen had been “deceived” in
granting the patent and that it was contrary to common law. See Federico, supra note 10, at 301.
Though the Statute was not enacted directly after the decision in this case, the uproar of the public
caused by the Crown’s grants alongside this decision and previous attempts to enact the legislation
led the Parliament, 20 years later, to finally legislate the Statute. See D. Seaborne Davies, Further
Light on the Case of Monopolies, 48 L. Q. REV. 394 (1932), for a comprehensive discussion of the Case
of Monopolies.
54
55
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were not the only to abuse their power. Queen Elizabeth I provided her grantees with
arbitrary powers to search the stores and houses of suspected infringers, and collect
heavy penalties from the guilty.63 These grantees often knew little of the particular
art, and were granted a monopoly as the Crown's treasury was low in funds. 64 The
monopoly system became a system of plunder.65 As the grant of letters patent was
considered part of the royal prerogative, and was given by the favor and grace of the
Queen, the Crown regarded itself as the sole patron and arbitrator of any dispute
related to the new industries introduced by the authority of its letters patent. 66 Letter
patents were rarely disputed in the courts of common-law, as appealing to the courts
would have been considered disrespectful of the Queen's authority and was viewed as
a challenge on her absolute right of jurisdiction in all disputes arising from the letters
patent.67 There was also no established right which allowed a challenge to the validity
of royal grants in the courts of common-law. Thus, letters patent became constant
sources of resentment.68 Following the public protests against the letters patent there
were several attempts to legislate a bill to limit the Queen's prerogative.69
The Statute of Monopolies of 1623 was enacted on May 1624. 70 The Statute
repealed the practice of royal monopoly grants declaring:
[T]hat all monopolies and all commissions, grants, licenses, charters, and
letters patents heretofore made or granted, or hereafter to be made or
granted to any person or persons . . . or corporate . . . for the sole buying,
Federico, supra note 10, at 299.
The Queen obtained her share of the money by charging annual rents for the patents, either by
a cash payment or a share of the profits from a grant. See Klitzke, supra note 45, at 623; Federico,
supra note 10, at 299; Nard & Morriss, supra note 22, at 264.
65 Klitzke, supra note 45, at 644.
66 Federico, supra note 10, at 298-99.
67 E. Wyndham Hulme, The History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative and at Common
Law, 12 L.Q. REV. 141, 151 (1896); Ramon A., Klitzke, Historical Background of the English Patent
Law, 41 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 615, 637-38 (1959).
68 Id. at 299.
69 The distress and annoyance caused by the letters patent and the abusive conduct of the
grantees led to many protests being raised in Parliament. The Queen managed to control these
protests, which were manifested in the form of bills aimed at legislating the process of granting letters
patent. She managed to push away the Parliament’s first attempt in 1597. However, she was unable
to resist the Parliament’s second attempt in 1601. In her speech in Parliament, the Queen granted
the courts of common-law the jurisdiction to decide which grants should be allowed to stand. She
issued a proclamation revoking at once the worst monopolies and leaving the others, free from any
restraint, to be tried in the courts of common-law, thus leaving it to the courts to decide what grants
should be allowed to stand, and guaranteed immunity to those seeking to test the monopolies’ validity.
The bill in parliament was then withdrawn. The Queen asserted and retained to the end of her reign
the absolute right of jurisdiction in all disputes arising out of those grants. The Case of Monopolies
was one of the first cases brought to court following the Queen’s proclamation. Her successor, King
James I, however was not as successful, and the situation was worse than in the previous reign. See
Federico, supra note 10, at 300-02. It was during the reign of Elizabeth’s successor, James I, in 1924
that the Statute of Monopolies was passed. Rich, supra note 41, at 242. See Nard & Morriss, supra
note 22, at 271-88 (discussion of James I reign until the enactment of the Statute). But cf., it has
already been ascertained, but not widely recognized, that James I supported the passage of the Bill.
See Chris R Kyle, “But a New Button to an Old Coat”: The Enactment of the Statute of Monopolies, 21
James I Cap 3, 19 J. LEGAL HISTORY 203, 218 (1998).
70 Statute
of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1624) (Eng.), available at:
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/English_Statute1623.pdf.
63
64
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selling, making, working, or using of anything within this realm . . . are
altogether contrary to the laws of this realm, and so are and shall be utterly
void and of none effect . . . .71
The declaration in Section 1, above, that all monopolies, including letters patents
are contrary to the law, was the heart of the Statute.72 Having said that, the statute
limits the categorical ban on monopolies:
(a) Provided also, that any declaration before mentioned shall not extend to
any letters patents (b) and grants of privilege for the term of fourteen years
or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole working or making of any
manner of new manufactures within this realm (c) to the true and first
inventor (d) and inventors of such manufactures, which others at the time
of making such letters patents and grants shall not use (e), so as also they be
not contrary to the law nor mischievous to the state by raising prices of
commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient (f): the same
fourteen years to be accounted from the date of the first letters patents or
grant of such privilege hereafter to be made, but that the same shall be of
such force as they should be if this act had never been made, and of none
other (g). 73
This section served as the basis of the English patent law for more than two
hundred years.74 It excluded several classes of grants from the categorical ban on
monopolies: letters patents were not to be prejudiced by the statute if they had been
granted for new inventions for not more than fourteen years. 75 The meaning of the
term “to invent” was “to originate, to bring into use formally or by authority, to found,
establish, institute or appoint.”76 The “inventor” in the Statute is not the inventor of
modern day “invention.”77
The Statute did not present fundamentally new ideas. The principles proclaimed
were already established in the common law,78 discussed twenty years before in the
case of monopolies and the following case law. 79 It re-established that the validity of
all monopolies and patents is to be determined by the courts of common law.80 In 1601
Statute of Monopolies §1 (emphasis added).
Bracha (2004), supra note 43, at 196.
73 Statute of Monopolies § 6 (emphasis added).
74 Walterscheid (1994), supra note 26, at 875.
75 Federico, supra note 10, at 303.
76 E. Wyndham Hulme, On the History of Patent Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,
18 L. Q. REV. 280, 280 (1902).
77 A modern day patentable “invention” has to be “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof . . . .” (35 U.S.C.
§ 101).
78 Federico, supra note 10, at 303; but cf., Walterscheid (1994), supra note 26, at 874, n. 104 (some
disagreement among the various commentators as to the extent to which the statute actually departed
from existing law).
79 Federico, supra note 10, at 303.
80 Statute of Monopolies § 2: “And all monopolies, and all such commissions, grants, licenses,
charters, letters patents, proclamations, inhibitions, restraints, warrants of assistance, and all other
matters and things tending as aforesaid, and the force and validity of them, and every of them, ought
71
72
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Queen Elizabeth I gave up her right to determine the validity of her grants in her own
courts.81 This was prior to the Case of Monopolies and long before the Statute of
Monopolies.82 The position of the grantee, the inventor, was not changed by the
statute. An inventor did not have a right to a patent and the statute did not confer
upon him any such right. He was still in the position of a humble petitioner of the
Crown's grace.83
Based on the above we can say that the identity of “the true and first inventor and
inventors”84 is any person, persons or corporate.85 Besides the mentioning of the
corporate, which will be explained shortly, it is quite clear that the Statute considers
patents to be introduced by individuals. The manufacturing process, or the
introduction of a new industry, at the basis of the patent are done by individuals. The
inventor is necessarily a person.
The question that still remains is how the above conclusion sits with the mention
of a corporate. Section 9 includes a list of exceptions relating to corporations. 86 These
to be, and shall be forever hereafter examined, heard, tried, and determined, by and according to the
common laws of this realm, and not otherwise.” (emphasis added).
81 Ramon A., Klitzke, Historical Background of the English Patent Law, 41 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 615, 638 (1959).
82 Klitzke, supra note 45, at 638.
83 Federico, supra note 10, at 303-04.
84 Statute of Monopolies § 6.
85 Statute of Monopolies § 1. Similarly, these grantees are also mentioned in Sections 3 and 4.
Section 3 states:
And all person and persons, bodies politic and corporate whatsoever, which now are
or hereafter shall be, shall stand and be disabled, and incapable to have, use,
exercise, or put in ure any monopoly, or any such commission, grant, license,
charter, letters patents, proclamation, inhibition, restraint, warrant of assistance,
or other matter or thing tending as aforesaid, or any liberty, power, or faculty
grounded or pretended to be grounded upon them, or any of them.
However, § 4 which establishes the jurisdiction of the common-law courts to examine and determine
the validity of monopolies, alongside § 2, only refers to “person and persons,” as follows:
And if any person or persons at any time after the end of forty days next after the
end of this present session of parliament shall be hindered, grieved, disturbed, or
disquieted, or his or their goods or chattels any way seized, attached, distrained,
taken, carried away, or detained by occasion or pretext of any monopoly, or of any
such commission, grant, license, power, liberty, faculty, letters patents,
proclamation, inhibition, restraint, warrant of assistance, or other matter or thing
tending as aforesaid, and will sue to be relieved in or for any of the premises, that
then and in every such case the same person and persons shall and may have his
and their remedy for the same at then common law by any action or actions to be
grounded upon this statute . . . .
Having said that, it is not unreasonable that only a person or persons have standing in the commonlaw courts as representatives of the corporation.
86 Statute of Monopolies § 9:
Provided also, that this act or anything therein contained shall not in any wise
extend or be prejudicial unto the city of London, or to any city, borough, or town
corporate within this realm, for or concerning any grants, charters, or letters patent
to them, or any of them made or granted, or for or concerning any custom or customs
used by or within them or any of them; or unto any corporations, companies, or
fellowships of any art, trade, occupation, or mystery, or to any companies, or
societies of merchants within this realm erected for the maintenance, enlargement,
or ordering of any trade or merchandise; but that the same charters, customs,
corporations, companies, fellowships, and societies, and their liberties, privileges,
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exceptions were included to preserve the monopolies granted to trading companies due
to the role they played in the promotion of foreign trade. 87 The explanation provided
by Robert Ashton,88 of what these trading companies are, resembles guilds and for this
reason the inclusion of these trading companies in Section 3 does not have bearing on
this article's thesis.89
The Statute of Monopolies remained the only statute on patents in England until
a period far into the nineteenth century. 90 It would be the young United States that
would first provide the English speaking world with a legislative enactment treating
the concept of the patent as property.
B. American Colonies and States
The trend of providing inventors legal monopolies over their inventions gradually
spread to and throughout the American Colonies with the settlers. 91 Skilled craftsmen
were an important resource in the colonies. There was a high demand, but shortage
in people.92 Patent grants in American colonies were deeply rooted in the English
letters patent.93 The colonial assembly, the representatives of the community, tried to
entice such skilled artisans in the same manner as Queen Elizabeth I had done
before.94 The colonial assembly had the discretion to grant a patent. In the absence of
the monarch one had to petition the legislature, offer specific public benefits, and hope
to receive a case-specific privilege.95 Yet the “seventeenth century [common law]
developments that reshaped the English framework were, for the most part, absent in
the colonies.”96
Some colonies legislated local feeble versions of the Statute of Monopolies. Yet
these were mainly declaratory acts with little practical effect. 97 For example, the
Colony of Connecticut passed such law in 1672 deeming that “There shall be no
powers, and immunities, shall be and continue of such force and effect as they were
before the making of this act, and of none other; anything before in this act not
contained to the contrary in any wise notwithstanding.
87 Chris Dent, ‘Generally Inconvenient’: The 1624 Statute of Monopolies as Political Compromise,
33 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 415, 449 (2009) (mentioning also that this was done despite complaints
being made against trading corporations in the 1624 Parliament).
88 ROBERT ASHTON, THE CITY AND THE COURT: 1603-1643, at 72 (1979) cited in Dent, supra note
87, at 449, n. 235.
89 This approach is reaffirmed by Sir Edward Coke whose interpretation of what was meant by
“the true and first inventor” is the person or individuals who first introduced or discovered the
invention and worked it in England. He is silent about the corporations. Sir Edward Coke, Lord Chief
Justice of England, published his Institutes of the Laws of England, in which he provides a
contemporary commentary on the Statute of Monopolies. EDWARD COKE, 3 INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 181-85 (1797).
90 Federico, supra note 10, at 305.
91 Frank D. Prager, Historic Background and Foundation of American Patent Law, 5 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 309, 311 (1961).
92 Bracha (2009), supra note 14, at 372.
93 Bracha (2004), supra note 43, at 211.
94 Bracha (2009), supra note 14, at 372.
95 Id. at 213.
96 Id. at 214.
97 Id. at 214 (referring to them the more sophisticated).
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monopoly granted or allowed amongst us, but of such new inventions as shall be
adjudged profitable to the country, and for such time as the General Court shall deem
meet.”98 Similarly, the Massachusetts 1641 Body of Liberties provided “No monopolies
shall be granted or allowed amongst us, but of such new Inventions that are profitable
to the Countrie, and that for a short time.”99 The Act of March 26, 1784 of South
Carolina stated “The inventors of useful machines shall have a like exclusive privilege
of making or vending their machines for the like term of fourteen years, under the
same privileges and restrictions hereby granted to, and imposed on, the authors of
books.”100
The state patent legislation says nothing about the who is the innovator, the
identity of the inventor, and simply echoes Section 6 of Statute of Monopolies. “The
only respect in which the later state legislation showed any sign of change was the
growing differentiation of invention patents as a special subset of grants, and the
gradual emergence of the modem concept of invention.” Having said that, “the state
legislation did not move at all from the patent-privileges model.”101
C. Development of the Federal Patent System
On the eve of signing the Constitution, in 1789, though more than a century of
semi-independent development had passed, the American patent grant practice was
still rather similar on both the practical and the conceptual level to the traditional
English framework. In fact, Colonial and State patent legislation and their
bureaucratic practices were more similar to the early English individual privileges,
granted as a result of a case-specific policy-political decision by government in the
name of the public good,102 than its contemporaneous British counterpart. 103
The genesis of the U.S. federal patent system was in the Intellectual Property
Clause of the Constitution that gave Congress the power to “promote the Progress of
Sciences and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”104 Some argue that the
U.S. Constitution created the “first modem patent institution regime.”105 Others go
further and draw from the constitutional text far-reaching conclusions about an
underlying concept of patents as rights, and even as natural rights. 106 The justification
for recognition of rights in intellectual output will be discussed at length in the Part
III. However, not everyone shares this view. Critics say that there is no reason to
assume that, apart from creating the grant power on the federal level, the clause
constituted any break with traditional patterns and that they have rejected the idea
See Ramsey, supra note 55, at 13.
See Bracha (2004), supra note 43, at 214.
100 See Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO.
L.J. 109, 115 (1929).
101 Bracha (2004), supra note 43, at 215.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 216.
104 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
105 B. Zorina Khan & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, History Lessons: The Early Development of Intellectual
Property Institutions in the United States, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 233, 235 (2001).
106 Prager, supra note 91, at 318.
98
99
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that patent protection was some sort of natural right. 107 The immediate sources of
influence and inspiration available to the framers were English patents and the grant
practice in the colonies and the states.108 There is no evidence that any of the framers
contemplated, at that stage, a break with those familiar patterns or the creation of a
“modem patent system.”109
The enactment of the Constitution was followed by a flood of various individual
privilege petitions. Congress thus decided to legislate a general law. 110 It passed the
1790 Act to Promote the Progress of the Useful Arts. 111 Its wording, as well as those
of the Acts which followed, was influenced by the late eighteenth century crisp vision
of the patent rights idea consolidated with some ideological support. 112
“In some respects, the 1790 Act did constitute a break from previous traditions
and the beginning of a modem patent system.”113 It “created a general patent regime”
and “patents were no longer case-specific, legislative grants” of the colonial assembly
or states.114 Neither was it an arrangement of defining the “outer-limits of an
exception to a general ban on monopolies,” as the Statue of Monopolies did.115 Instead,
the “Act defined in comprehensive terms the outline of a uniform patent regime,”
though the grant process remained a matter of privilege. 116 It was a sort of a hybrid
between the old English and colonial privilege regime and the patent-rights model that
modern patent system entails.117 The Act also provided its account on the identity of
the inventor. Section 1 states:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That upon the petition of any
person or persons . . . setting forth, that he, she, or they, hath or have
invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or
device, or any improvement therein not before known or used, and praying
that a patent may be granted therefor . . . to such petitioner or
petitioners, his, her or their heirs, administrators or assigns for any
term not exceeding fourteen years, the sole and exclusive right and liberty of
making, constructing, using and vending to others to be used, the said
invention or discovery.118
The inventor is no longer of the craftsman (or craftswoman) but an intellectual
inventor who creates and discovers. This image of the inventor (the patentee following
the grant of the patent) is a common thread through the sections of the Act.
107 Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought about Patents? Reevaluating the
Patent Privilege in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 963-65 (2007).
108 Ramsey, supra note 55, at 15.
109 Bracha (2004), supra note 43, at 216.
110 Id. at 216.
111 An Act To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112,
available at: http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/Patent_Act_of_1790.pdf.
112 Bracha (2004), supra note 43, at 219.
113 Id. at 219.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 222.
118 Patents Act of 1970 § 1 (emphasis added).
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This Act was replaced three years later by the Patent Act of 1793, 119 which
established a registration system, alongside the examination process its predecessor
ascertained.120 The Act, similar to its 1790 predecessor, identifies the person as the
inventor. The Act stated as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That when any person or
persons, being a citizen or citizens of the United States, shall allege that he
or they have invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or used before
the application, and shall present a petition to the Secretary of State,
signifying a desire of obtaining an exclusive property in the same, and
praying that a patent may be granted therefor . . . and giving a short
description of the said invention or discovery, and thereupon granting to such
petitioner, or petitioners, his, her, or their heirs, administrators or
assigns, for a term not exceeding fourteen years, the full and exclusive right
and liberty of making, constructing, using, and vending to others to be used,
the said invention or discovery.121
The Patent Act of 1836122 is “generally acknowledged to be the foundation for the
modem patent examination system in the U.S. It created the Patent Office, a service
of examiners, modem interference practice, administrative appeal practice, and the
modem patent numbering system:”123
And be it further enacted, That any person or persons having discovered
or invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, not known or used by others before
his or their discovery or invention thereof, and not, at the time of his
application for a patent, in public use or on sale, with his consent or
allowance, as the inventor or discoverer; and shall desire to obtain an
exclusive property therein, may make application in writing to the
Commissioner of Patents, expressing such desire, and the Commissioner, on
due proceedings had, may grant a patent therefor.124

119 An Act To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112,
available
at:
http://www.ipmall.info/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/Patent_Act_of_1790.pdf.
120 Walterscheid, supra note 26, at 63, 72-73. There are a number of reasons accounting for the
short life of the Patent Act of 1790. See Bracha (2004), supra note 43, at 227; Craig Allen Nard, Legal
Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 BOSTON U. L. REV. 51, 65 (2010).
121 Patents Act of 1973 § 1 (emphasis added).
122 Patent
Act
of
1836,
Ch.
357,
5
Stat.
117,
available
at:
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/patent_act_of_1836.pdf.
123 Walterscheid (1997), supra note 26, at 63.
124 Patent Act of 1836 § 6 (emphasis added).
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With regard to this article, the Act demonstrates the view of the federal system
regarding the image of the inventor, by laying down a list of obligations the individual
has to comply with to be granted a patent. Also, the use of the word “he” is providing
further support of the argument that the federal patent system placed the individual
at the heart of the innovation process.
Granted, we could not expect Acts legislated in the late eighteenth century to
foresee the advancement of technological innovation which led to the development of a
new understanding of how innovation is produced. The importance of the review so
far is that these Acts had bearing on how the current U.S. Patent Act is phrased, and
more importantly, how the law views innovation production—as being initiated by the
individual inventor.
The current act in power is the Patent Act of 1952. 125 It has undergone some
radical changes during 2011,126 mainly the decision to change the “first-to-invent”
principle to “first-to-file” system.127 The “first-to-file” system is employed by most
countries of the world. The U.S. jointed the “first-to-file family of nations” on March
16, 2013. According to this principle, a patent will be granted to the first person filing
an application. Some say that this change benefits corporations, which may also
include the innovative entity.128 However, I do not argue that incentivizing the
innovative entity should be on the expenses of the individual inventor. The system can
allow them both to coexist. Contrarily, the “first-to-invent” principle grants a patent
to the person who first invented it and thus promoting the identification of the “real”
inventor.129 First-to-invent served not only as an incentive to motivate individual
inventors, but also to protect them from large firms and their resources, preferring to
file an application and be granted a patent than paying royalties to the person whom
is the true inventor.130
The focus on the individual as the inventor is evident throughout the Act as
follows:
When used in this title unless the context otherwise indicates -

125 The Patent Act of 1952, Title 35 U.S.C., Ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 792, available at:
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title35/pdf/USCODE-2011-title35.pdf.
126 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
127 35 U.S.C. § 102.
128 Andrew L. Sharp, Misguided Patent Reform: The Questionable Constitutionality of First-toFile, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1227, 1236-7 (2013) (“First-to-file will require the few individual patent
applicants still remaining to engage in a race to the patent office, a race corporations with deep pockets
will win. Corporations have the resources to file large numbers of applications, they can hire the most
competent attorneys, and they have the procedures in place to quickly file an application after an
employee conceives of an idea. Individual applicants do not have the resources to file numerous
applications, and they generally do not have attorneys on retainer ready to file an application. As a
result, large, well-funded corporations will systematically win the patent race, and their share of the
economy will further grow”).
129 Masaaki Kotabe, Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Patent Systems, 23 J. INT’L BUS.
STUD. 147, 149-51 (1992).
130 Cotropia, supra note 16, at 55, 66-68; Marl A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH.
L. REV. 709, 710 (2012). As I further discuss, the “individualism” nature of the patent system
currently extends to the sole organization as well.
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...
(f) The term ‘inventor’ means the individual or, if a joint invention, the
individuals collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter of the
invention.
(g) The terms ‘joint inventor’ and ‘coinventor’ mean any 1 of the individuals
who invented or discovered the subject matter of a joint invention. 131
When discussing the conditions for patentability, the law asserts that a
person will be entitled to a patent.
(a) NOVELTY; PRIOR ART. A person shall be entitled to a patent unless— 132
Similarly, ownership is a personal activity:
Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of
personal property.133
In summary, we see that throughout its development, the U.S. patent system
views the individual as the center of the innovation process. The individual is the
inventor, and it is the individual who is the future patentee. This view of the
innovation process is quite straight forward when taking into account how patent law
came to be—its roots are in the English Statute of Monopolies.
III. INCENTIVIZING INNOVATION THROUGH THE PATENT SYSTEM: REVIEW OF MAIN
JUSTIFICATIONS
It is unclear if the federal patent system gave rise to the property rights discourse,
or if this discourse gave rise to the federal system. However, it is quite clear the two
are intertwined, stemming from the same reasoning: the image of the intellectual
genius, heroic inventor, as an owner of their intellectual product.
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the inventor,
previously identified indistinguishably with the craftsman, came to be identified as
intellectual genius.134 This new founded persona of the inventor alongside the
transformation of the institutional model of patents and the appearance of property
rights during the first half of the nineteenth century were echoed in the justifications
aimed to incentivize invention and innovation.135 In the early days, the inventor,
identified as either an artisan or a skilled craftsman received a privilege—a grant from
the monarch. This was not a property right as the monarch retained all ownership of
property. It was the uproar against privileges and aspiration to be granted a right in
one's work that ignited the discussion of rights. These justifications were based on the
35 U.S.C. § 100 (emphasis added).
35 U.S.C. § 102.
133 35 U.S.C. § 261.
134 Bracha (2009), supra note 14, at 370.
135 Bracha (2004), supra note 43, at 218.
131
132
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development of property rights in the eighteenth century “as one of the core civil rights
parallel to, and mutually reinforcing, the right to life and the right to liberty.”136
A set of justifications emerged, accompanying the new image of the inventor, as
an owner of intellectual assets, for his government-protected entitlements. These
justifications consisted of a mix of natural right in the fruit of one's labor and
utilitarian arguments.137 Both the natural right and the utilitarian justifications are
based on the same underlying concept of the individual at the center of the innovation
process—the person who creates new innovations through her intellectual capacity. 138
A. Locke’s Law of Nature and the Personality Theory
One of the main theories used to justify property rights is the labor theory which
is based on John Locke’s theory of natural law. John Locke is the “most important
philosopher in the establishment and development of property rights. At the time when
Locke developed his well-known defense of the labour theory to just that man could
claim property, there was no perception that the rights generated by patents actually
constituted property rights.”139
The terminology used by Locke shows that this theory is also focused on the
individual inventor. Locke can be viewed as asserting that every person has a natural right to
the fruits of her labor, regardless of whether the creation is physical or intellectual. Whatever a
person has removed out of its natural state, and mixed her labor therewith, belongs to
her.140 This right cannot be compromised even if allocating such rights decreases social
welfare.141 “Locke’s conclusion that a person has a property right in the fruits of her
labor follows from his argument that a person owns a right to her own body, hence to
the labor of her body, and therefore to anything that results from mixing her labor with
common resources.”142 The focus on the individual is even apparent from the additional condition
specified by Locke for the acquisition of property: the duty to leave enough for others asserts
that one may prevent others from using her labor product only if there remain
sufficient resources in the public domain to allow others to labor and acquire property
as well.143
Another theory that is often used to “justify the need for the patent system is
Hegel's personality theory”144 as refined by Radin.145 According to this theory, “private
Haugen, supra note 12, at 448.
Bracha (2009), supra note 14 at 374-75, 377-78.
138 Id. at 375.
139 Haugen, supra note 12, at 448.
140 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 25-29 (Jonathan Bennett ed., 2008) (1690),
available at: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1689a.pdf; Ofer Tur-Sinai, Beyond
Incentives: Expanding the Theoretical Framework for Patent Law Analysis, 45 AKRON L. REV. 243,
257-59 (2012) [hereinafter Tur-Sinai (2012)].
141 Eli M. Salzberger, The Law and Economics Analysis of Intellectual Property: Paradigmatic
Shift from Incentives to Traditional Property, 7 REV. L. & ECON. 435, 437 (2010).
142 Tur-Sinai (2012), supra note 140, at 258.
143 In fact, Locke specified two additional conditions, the second one being the no waste
prohibition. Since it is less relevant to the point I am trying to make here I do not discuss it further.
For a review of Locke’s second condition see Tur-Sinai (2012), supra note 140, at 270-72.
144 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (S.W. Dyde trans., 2001) (1821).
145 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
136
137
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property is necessary as a means of developing and realizing one’s personality.”146 A
person's self-identity is intertwined with their control over assets. The conclusion “is
that every person should receive a threshold amount of property that would enable
them to function as a free individual and develop their personality.”147
B. The Utilitarian Approach
There is universal agreement that the purpose of the patent system is to promote
innovation, through the creation of inventions, by granting exclusive rights to the
patentee.148 This is the basic utilitarian purpose of the patent system.149 The
underlying assumption is that patent protection of intellectual product is necessary
due to its “public good” attribute, since research output is comprised in part (and
sometimes entirely) of intangible property. The distinctive characteristics of a public
good are “non-excludable” and “non-rivalrous.” It can be used by multiple parties
without diminishing its availability and it is almost impossible to exclude others from
appropriating it.150 Put simply, the enjoyment of one person does not exclude
enjoyment by others. These characteristics in combination may serve as a disincentive
for innovation. Potential innovators would know that once they revealed their
breakthroughs to the world other people would be able to take advantage of them for
free whereas innovators would not be able to recoup the costs of their innovations.
Since appropriating such assets is easy, this leads to free riders, which diminishes
incentives to invent and innovate.151 This argument implies that there is “a danger
that the pace of technological innovation will fall below socially optimal levels.”152
Another argument asserts that potential inventors might devote their energies to other
more lucrative activities at the expense of others, causing society at large to suffer. 153
The patent system overcomes these obstacles and promotes innovation by
granting the patentee the right to exclude others from practicing the patented
invention, thus enhancing incentives to invent while mitigating market failure (the
Tur-Sinai (2012), supra note 140, at 274 (emphasis added).
Id.
148 Though opinions are divided as to whether the patent system actually achieves its goals. See
Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1580-81 (citing defenders of the patent system, vocal critics, and
those who cannot decide whether the system is good or bad).
149 Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1596-97; Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110
MICH. L. REV. 709, 736 (2012); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024-28 (1989).
150 Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1580-81 (stating that the public good is usually expensive to
develop but easy to appropriate); See also e.g., Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual
Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 52
(Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2002).
151 Peter Lee, Social Innovation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 25 (2014). See also, Eisenberg, supra note
149, at 1024-25.
152 William Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoretical, Empirical, and Historical
Perspectives, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Innovation.pdf (last visited June 6, 2016).
153 This argument was developed by scholars like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, Jeremy
Bentham, A Manual of Political Economy (1793-95), in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 31, 49
(John
Bowring
ed.,
1843),
available
at:
http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/bentham/manualpoliticaleconomy.pdf), and JOHN STUART
MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (John M. Robson, ed., 5th ed., 1862)). See id. n. 1, at 2.
146
147
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incentive theory).154 This right is given to the patentee for a limited time in exchange
for her disclosure of the new technology to the public (the disclosure theory),155 thus
encouraging the disclosure of inventions that might otherwise be kept secret. 156 During
this limited time period the patentee “should be able to cover her R&D costs and make
a reasonable profit in the market with her invention.”157
These incentives to innovate, in the form of allocation of private rights, are most
effective “if the rewards of exclusivity are bestowed upon a single owner rather than a
diffuse group among whom royalties must be split.” It is for this reason that the patent
system must “identify individual inventors to whom it can assign exclusive rights.”158
Prospect theory is another theory which provides economic justifications for the
patent system.159 It was developed in light of the fundamental controversy regarding
the proper scope, availability, and even need for patents in order to optimize
innovation. While the basic agreement between inventor and society embodies
utilitarian goals, how this agreement should be implemented remains unclear.160
Prospect theory is rooted in many of the same economic traditions as incentive
theory, however its focus is not on ex-ante incentives to innovate. Instead, it
emphasizes granting ownership to one patentee in order to control R&D and to

154 Lee, supra note 151, at 25. Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1580 (“such legal restraints on
patentable inventions are justifiable if they offer a net benefit to society, trading the disutility of
restricted output and higher prices for the greater social utility of inventions that might otherwise not
be produced”). See Salzberger, supra note 141, at 439-40, for a comprehensive discussion of this
theory.
155 The limited time (and scope) of the monopoly is also important from an economic point of view.
It mitigates the phenomenon of owners setting (usually) a price that will maximize their profits,
leading to underuse of innovation, rather than a price, which equals their marginal or average cost of
production. See Salzberger, supra note 141, at 441; Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic
Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 (2005) (a patent does not provide absolute exclusion, but rather
presents a legal right to try to exclude). However, this limited time monopoly raises concerns
regarding its possible consequence of restraints on the patentability of future inventions. See Ofer
Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation in Patent Law: Making Sense of Incentives, 50 IDEA 723, 725 (2010)
(explaining that the cumulative nature of innovation dictates the frequent need of inventors to rely
on the discoveries and inventions of previous inventors in order to make their own contribution, and
that the potential conflict between the exclusive rights and the need to capitalize on their invention
in order to continue developing the technology may result in a chilling effect). Having said that, the
concerns regarding access to patentable technology are beyond the scope of this work. The Disclosure
Theory, though considered a utilitarian justification, is subordinate to the primary utilitarian
justification—the Incentive Theory. See Eisenberg, supra note 149, at 1028-30.
156 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614–16 (National
Bureau of Economics Research (NBER) ed., 1962). But cf., Lemley, supra note 130, at 745 (explaining
that nowadays patent description and claims are worded vaguely and broadly, which prevents future
inventors from learning about the protected technology, thus violating the contract between inventor
and society, concluding that the justification behind disclosure theory does not support the current
patent system).
157 Tur-Sinai (2012), supra note 140, at 248.
158 Lee, supra note 151, at 27 (emphasis added).
159 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
160 Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1599 (providing a comprehensive discussion of the five distinct
approaches to the proper scope and allocation of patent rights).
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efficiently diffuse it into the market through licensing.161 The granting of exclusive
rights to individual patentees:
enhances social efficiency by allowing the patentee to rationally coordinate
the development of a technological prospect. These efficiency gains stem from
the fact that a single entity manages a technological resource that would be
lost if a diverse group of loosely affiliated individuals all had claims on the
invention.162
The fundamental economic bases of this approach are the “tragedy of the
commons”163 and the hypothetical Coasean world without transaction costs. 164 The
tragedy of the commons calls for privatization (or commodification) of public goods to
ensure the enjoyment of everyone. The most notable example in this context is the
greenery which is open for everyone to herd their sheep. People with access to common
property overuse it because each individual reaps all of the benefits of his personal use,
but shares only a small portion of the costs. 165 The establishment of individual
property rights prevents these situations. Kitch's prospect theory places a strong
emphasis on the role of a single patentee in coordinating the development,
implementation, and improvement of an invention.166 The theory is supported by the
Coase theorem. According to this theorem, giving one party the power to control and
orchestrate all subsequent use and R&D relating to the patented technology should
result in efficient licensing, assuming information is perfect, all parties are rational,
and licensing is costless.167 Though this theory has been the object of criticism, its
relevance here stems from its emphasis on regulating the individual's activity, while
the individual may very well be an organization. 168 It is the individual’s action which
needs to be regulated to foster innovation, and this action is comprised of public
goods.169
161 Id. at 1600. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 130, at 711; Kitch, supra note 159, at 276-78; Robert
P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2660-61
(1994).
162 Lee, supra note 151, at 27. Cf. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. 347, 354-56 (1967).
163 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
164 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Salzberger,
supra note 141, at 461 (“Coase argued that inefficient legal rules will be bypassed by individuals
attempting to achieve efficient allocation of entitlement, but this will happen only when there are no
transaction costs”).
165 Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1600; Salzberger, supra note 141, at 463 (explaining that the
tragedy of the commons describes a situation in which an increase in demand in the absence of
property rights leads to over-consumption, and the tragedy lies in creating a worse situation for all
individuals).
166 Kitch, supra note 159, at 271-80.
167 Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1602.
168 Tur-Sinai (2012), supra note 140, at 250.
169 It is important to note here that the current ongoing trend of commercialization of research
outputs imposes increasingly high transactions costs to obtain IPR, monitor, enforce, negotiate and
license these outputs. The result of the expanded coverage of IPRs and the increased transaction costs
is the reduced volume of research that is accessible, de-facto impeding the production of new
innovation. See Lawrence Lessig, Free(ing) Culture for Remix, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 961 (2004). See,
e.g., Fisher, supra note 152, at 4 (“Suppose Innovator #2 wishes to build upon the work of Innovator
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IV. THE EVOLUTION OF INNOVATION PRODUCTION THEORIES
Today innovation is mostly identified with economists' definition of innovation:
Innovation activities are all scientific, technological, organizational, financial
and commercial steps which actually, or are intended to, lead to the
implementation of innovations. Some innovation activities are themselves
innovative, others are not novel activities but are necessary for the
implementation of innovations. Innovation activities also include R&D that
is not directly related to the development of a specific innovation.170
However, economists are not the only scholars interested and researching
innovation. Before economics developed a host of theories, beginning in the 1930s and
continuing to this day, anthropologists and sociologists formulated their own theories
to explain how innovation is produced. Though economics ultimately won the
“definition race,” their theories were influenced and affected by the sociological and
anthropological theories. Their loss has bearing on the identity of the innovator as
described in the innovation production theories.
It is important to note that I use the term “innovator” in this Part and not
“inventor.” The innovator participates in all stages of the innovation process, including
diffusion of the commercialized output in the market. Her involvement is in the entire
process and does not end when the invention leaves the lab grounds and is
commercialized.
The sociologist Gabriel Tarde developed the first innovation theory. Tarde's theory
of innovation (known as “Tarde’s cycle”), 171 like his successors, is characterized by a
#1. The need to secure a license from Innovator #1 will, at a minimum, add to Innovator #2’s costs. If,
for some reason, Innovator #1 is unable or unwilling to grant the license, the work of Innovator #2
may be frustrated altogether”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1610-13. This phenomenon of IPRs
creating barriers to scientific R&D and innovation is referred to as the “tragedy of the anti-commons.”
See Michael Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). This is closely related to the concerns raised regarding
the limited monopoly as mentioned in supra note 155. However, empirical literature includes evidence
that both asserts and rejects the anti-common phenomenon. See Timothy Caulfield, et al., Patents,
commercialization and the Canadian stem cell research community, 3 REGEN. MED. 483 (2008) (as an
example of an empirical study that asserts the existence of the phenomenon); see also John P. Walsh,
Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Research Tool Patenting and Licensing and Biomedical Innovation,
in PATENTS IN KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (W. M. Cohen & S. Merrill, eds., National Academics
Press, 2003) (as an example of an empirical study that rejects the existence of the phenomenon).
170 OECD, OSLO MANUAL: GUIDELINES FOR COLLECTING AND INTERPRETING INNOVATION DATA
47
(2005),
http://www.oecd.org/innovation/inno/oslomanualguidelinesfor
collectingandinterpretinginnovationdata3rdedition.htm (hereinafter Oslo Manual) (last visited June
6, 2016).
171 Benoît Godin, Innovation: The History of a Category 27 (Project on the Intellectual History of
Innovation Working Paper No. 1, 2008), http://www.csiic.ca/PDF/IntellectualNo1.pdf [hereinafter
Godin (2008)] (last visited June 6, 2016). The sequence is as follows: multiple imitations (or
repetitions), which then enter into competition with each other, coming up against and opposing each
other - the opposition phase. This opposition is resolved, either through the destruction of the
imitation flows or through adaptation, which signifies creative joint production, that is the emergence
of a new invention. See Faridah Djellal & FaΪz Gallouj, The Laws of Imitation and Invention: Gabriel
Tarde and the Evolutionary Economics of Innovation 11 (2014), https://halshs.archivesouvertes.fr/halshs-00960607/document (translating from GABRIEL TARDE, LES LOIS SOCIALES 106
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sequential view of innovation. 172 Anthropologists also hold a sequential view of
innovation.173 Invention and diffusion came to be understood as part of the same
sequential or linear process: invention is followed by diffusion. 174 Both of these
sequential views begin with a single entity. The use of the “word” entity here is not
done by mistake. These theories were focused on the individual (i.e., a singular, person
or organization) recognized as the innovator.
Sociologists viewed innovation as a linear process led by a single individual, the
entrepreneur, or by a sole organization.175 The Sociologist Everett Rogers, considered
the ‘Schumpeter of sociologists’, introduced a definition of innovation still used
extensively in the literature. Innovation is “an idea perceived as new by an
individual . . . or other unit of adoption.”176 Historians and psychologists joined
sociologists, even though their view of the innovator was more extreme177 as they saw
the innovator as a great man, a genius or a hero.178 For sociologists an innovator was
not one who invents but one who adopts an invention for the first time. Nonetheless
they saw innovation as a social rather than an individual process.179 Their view
strongly relates to the discussion of the genius inventor in Part III. 180
For sociologists, an innovator is not one who just invents, but one who is engaged
in the social process that is innovation (rather than an individual process). 181
Certainly “without the inventor there can be no inventions,” 182 but “the inventors are
not the only individuals responsible for invention.” 183 Invention is not a one-step
creation but a cumulative (or evolutionary) process. 184 It is also increasingly
systematic; and it is the output of organized research laboratories specifically
dedicated to this end. In this sense sociologists delineated a movement from the
independent inventor towards organized research in industrial laboratories. 185
(Félix Alcan, 8th ed., 1921) (1898): It is through imitative repetition that invention—the basic means
of social adaptation—spreads and becomes stronger and tends, through the conjunction of one of its
own imitation rays with an imitation ray emanating from some other invention, whether old or new,
either to arouse new struggles or, perhaps directly or perhaps as a result of such struggles, to yield
new, more complex inventions, which in turn will soon be radiating out imitatively, and so on
indefinitely).
172 See Godin (2008), supra note 171, at 32, for a comprehensive summary of sociologists’ sequence
of innovation starting with Tarde from the nineteenth century and ending with Rogers form the 1980s.
173 Benoît Godin, Innovation Without the Word: Willian F. Ogburn’s Contribution to Technological
Innovation Studies 32 (Project on the Intellectual History of Innovation Working Paper No. 5, 2010),
http://www.csiic.ca/PDF/IntellectualNo5.pdf [hereinafter Godin (2010a)].
174 Benoît Godin, Invention, Diffusion and Linear Models of Innovation 5 (Project on the
Intellectual
History
of
Innovation
Working
Paper
No.
15,
2013),
http://www.csiic.ca/PDF/AnthropologyPaper15.pdf [hereinafter Godin (2013)].
175 Benoît Godin, The Vocabulary of Innovation: A Lexicon 33 (Project on the Intellectual History
of Innovation Working Paper No. 20, 2014), http://www.csiic.ca/PDF/LexiconPaperNo20.pdf
[hereinafter Godin (2014)].
176 EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION 14, 11 (3rd ed., 1983) (emphasis added).
177 Godin (2014), supra note 175, at 33.
178 Godin (2008), supra note 171, at 28.
179 Id. at 30.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 S. COLUM GILFILLAN, THE SOCIOLOGY OF INVENTION 78 (1935).
183 Id. at 81. See also, Godin (2010a), supra note 173.
184 GILFILLAN, supra note 182, at 3.
185 Id. at 52-54, 63; HORNELL HART, THE TECHNIQUE OF SOCIAL PROGRESS 552-562 (1931).

[16:66 2016]

The Emergence of the Innovative Entity:
Is the Patent System Left Behind?

91

Schumpeter also placed the entrepreneur at the center of his theory. In his early
writings, known as Mark I, he describes the innovation process as carried out by an
individual innovator.186 Schumpeter also holds a sequential view of innovation: (1)
invention—the generation of new ideas; (2) innovation—the development of new ideas
into marketable products and processes; (3) diffusion—new products and processes
spread across the potential market.187 For Schumpeter, the entrepreneur, the
individual innovator, as an exceptional personality, endowed with particular
intellectual capacities and psychological characteristics, is motivated, exercises energy
and ingenuity, and is willing to make an effort to generate innovation.188 In this sense
Schumpeter's view of the entrepreneur is similar to that of the psychologists and
historians described above.
It is customary to distinguish between two Schumpeterian periods known as
Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II.189 Mark II signifies a shift in
Schumpeter’s understanding of the innovation process in which he claims that large
firms are the major source of innovation.190 This view is often thought to refer to some
sort of collaboration since the shift is associated with his understanding that the
market is moving towards larger industrial units. That is, research becomes corporate
but is also able to adapt to changing environments, especially the increasing
intervention of the public sector in research life (i.e., a growing need to interact with
the public sector.)191 Schumpeter is considered by some to be the first to have noted
the increasing importance of collective innovative activities.192
The purpose of the above review of varying perspectives of the different discipline
is to provide a general explanation of the innovation process, initiated by the innovator
and diffused into the market. But the unknown was greater than what was known.
They are silent as to what this process entails and what needs to be done to ensure its
186 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO
PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE (1934) [hereinafter SCHUMPETER
(1934)].
187 Paul Stoneman, Introduction, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 1, 2-3 (Paul Stoneman ed., 1995). See also, Benoît Godin, Innovation and
Science: When Science Had Nothing to Do with Innovation, and Vice-Versa 5, n. 3 (Project on the
Intellectual
History
of
Innovation
Working
Paper
No.
16,
2014),
http://www.csiic.ca/PDF/WorkingPaper16.pdf.
188 SCHUMPETER (1934), supra note 186, at 81-94.
189 Knut Ingar Westeren, Innovation: From Schumpeter to the Knowledge Economy, in
FOUNDATIONS OF THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY: INNOVATION, LEARNING AND CLUSTERS 57, 57-59 (Knut
Ingar Westeren ed., 2012).
190 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (Routledge, 1994) (1942).
See, e.g., David J. Teece, Competition, Cooperation, and Innovation Organizational Arrangements for
Regimes of Rapid Technological Progress, 18 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 1, 4 (1992) (Schumpeter’s
claim that large firms were necessary to promote innovation has fostered exploration of the links
between innovative performance and market structure. Schumpeter linked firm size and innovation
for three distinct reasons. First, he contended that only large firms could afford the cost of R&D
programs. Second, large, diversified firms could absorb failures by innovating across broad
technological fronts. Third, firms needed some element of market control to reap the rewards of
innovation. The Schumpeterian legacy has spurred discussion of the link between firm size and
innovation, and between market structure and innovation.).
191 Westeren, supra note 189.
192 Ben R. Martin, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven: Science, Technology and Innovation Policy
Studies–What Have We Learned? What Are the New Challenges? (15-19 September 2014, Slide 8), (on
file with author).
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success. The individual innovator or sole organization may be the source, but they are
only the tip of the iceberg. Views of how innovation is produced have greatly evolved
as reviewed below.
The 1950s-1960s, following economists' sequential view of innovation, joined by
social scientists from other disciplines, represented the development and proliferation
of the “black box” model of innovation.193 The basic assumption of this model is that
the input and output is more important than the innovation process itself.194 Studies
conducted at the time did not invest great effort inquiring into what transpires inside
the “black box.”195 As a “black box,” technological innovation was conceived to be a
system containing unknown components and processes. Economists attempted to
identify and measure the main inputs that went into the “black box,” and encountered
increased difficulty in their attempts to identify and measure its outputs.196 They
devoted very little thought to what actually went on inside the “box.” 197 Economists of
that time were more concerned in a way with the macro level rather than with the
micro level. The main focus was the individual innovator and particularly the sole
organization. Following Schumpeter's lead, economists were interested in the firm's
behavior, as at the time the firm was considered to be the organization involved in the
innovation process.198 Also, the economists’ focus on technological innovation did not
take into account other non-R&D activities that could be considered as innovation
(such as marketing, manufacturing, etc.).199
Studies conducted during the 1960s-1970s indicate a gradual “opening” of the
“black box” of innovation as researchers showed greater interest in the process of
innovation production.200 Two linear models emerged during this period: the
technology-push and the demand-pull model.201 According to the technology-push
model, innovation stems from basic R&D and the assumption is that “more R&D in”
results in “more successful new products out.” 202 Demand-pull, or market-pull, focuses
on the marketplace and on potential consumer demand as the catalysts of the
innovation process.203 The process was considered to be sequential, though not
necessarily continuous, which could be divided into a series of functionally distinct,

Dora Marinova & John Phillimore, Models of Innovation, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
31, 45-46 (Larisa van Shavinina ed., 2003).
194 Id. at 223.
195 NATHAN ROSENBERG, INSIDE THE BLACK BOX vii (1982).
196 Stephen J. Kline & Nathan Rosenberg, An Overview of Innovation, in THE POSITIVE SUM
STRATEGY: HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 275, 278 (Ralph Landau and Nathan
Rosenberg eds., 1986).
197 Id.
198 Benoît Godin, In The Shadow of Schumpeter: W. Rupert Maclaurin and the Study of
Technological Innovation 5 (Project on the Intellectual History of Innovation Working Paper No. 2,
2008), http://www.csiic.ca/PDF/IntellectualNo2.pdf.
199 Kline & Rosenberg, supra note 196, at 275, 278-79.
200 Marinova & Phillimore, supra note 193, at 46.
201 For an elaborate discussion on the two linear models see David Mowery & Nathan Rosenberg,
The Influence of Market Demand Upon Innovation: A Critical Review of Some Recent Empirical
Studies, 8 RES. POL’Y 102 (1979).
202 Roy Rothwell, Towards the Fifth-generation Innovation Process, 11 INT’L MARKETING REV. 7,
7-8 (1994).
203 D. Nobelius, Towards the Sixth Generation of R&D Management, 22 INT’L J. PROJECT MGMT.
369, 369-70 (2004).
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independent yet interacting stages. 204 The two models presented innovation as an
interplay between technology-push and demand-pull.205 This represented an opposite
view to the Schumpeterian perspective which regarded the innovation sequence as a
one- direction process.206
The main criticism directed against the linear models is that they do not provide
an accurate description of the real-life innovation process. This process cannot be
reduced to either technology-push or demand-pull, and cannot be treated as a sequence
of actions. This criticism is also relevant for the sequential models that preceded
technology-push and demand-pull and which were put forth by sociologists and
anthropologists. The question as to which comes first, technology-push or demandpull, or whether they occur simultaneously, is somewhat of a chicken or egg question
which remained undiscussed.207
While the linear models were thought to provide a simplified description of the
innovation process, the theory that followed took into account the complex interactions
involved in the process. The “interactive model” did not discard the notion of
technology-push and market-pull but rather incorporated them. Rothwell and Zegveld
described the newfound understanding of the innovation production process:
The overall pattern of the innovation process can be thought of as a complex
net of communication paths both intra-organizational and extraorganizational, linking together the various in-house functions and linking
the firm to the broader scientific and technological community and to the
marketplace. In other words the process of innovation represents the
confluence of technological capabilities and market-needs within the
framework of the innovating firm.208
This model stresses the variety of interactions necessary for the success of
innovation.209 Similar models were proposed by Rothwell as well as by Kline and
Rosenberg. Rothwell divided his discussion of the interactive model into two parts:
the “coupling model,” which is still essentially a sequential process but includes
feedback loops,210 and the “integrated model.”211 The latter appears to describe the
inter-organizational relationship, as it is mainly concerned with linking the firm to the
broader scientific and technological community and to the marketplace. The “coupling
model,” on the other hand, describes intra-organizational relationships as it focuses on
linking together various in-house functions.212 It seems that the two models present
different perspectives of the interactive model which should be examined together as
Rothwell, supra note 202, at 8-9.
JACOB SCHMOOKLER, INVENTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1966).
206 Bengt-Åke Lundvall, Innovation System Research: Where It Came From and Where It Might
Go
10
(Globelics
Working
Paper
Series
No.
2007-01,
2007),
http://www.globelics.org/publication/innovation-system-research-where-it-came-from-and-where-itmight-go-3/.
207 Marinova & Phillimore, supra note 193, at 46.
208 ROY ROTHWELL & WALTER ZEGVELD, REINDUSTRIALIZATION AND TECHNOLOGY 50 (1985).
209 Marinova & Phillimore, supra note 193, at 47.
210 Rothwell, supra note 202, at 9-11.
211 Id. at 11-12.
212 Id. at 10.
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parts of the overall model. Kline and Rosenberg proposed the “chain-link model” as an
alternative to the linear model. Similar to Rothwell's “coupling model,” it includes
feedback and loops which take into consideration potential innovators seeking existing
intra-organizational and inter-organizational knowledge. The “chain-link model” also
carries out additional research in order to resolve any possible problems arising from
each of the links in the innovation process chain. 213
The shortcoming of the interactive model is that it does not take into account the
environment in which firms operate, 214 as firms seldom operate alone.215 The concept
of Systems of Innovation (“SI”) emerged during the 1990s in response to this
shortcoming.216 Nonetheless, the focus was still on the entrepreneur as the individual
who drives the process described in the model. As Rothwell explains: “[A]t the very
heart of the successful innovation process were ‘key individuals’ of high quality and
ability; people with entrepreneurial flair and strong personal commitment to
innovation.”217
Preliminary signs of the emphasis which innovation theories placed on
collaboration could be found in Schumpeter’s later work, Mark II, which was
understood to reflect the realization of the role of teamwork and collaboration in the
innovation process. It was not, however, until the development of the SI model that
the need for collaboration in this process became a key concept.
The complexity of innovation requires interactions not only between units of the
firm but also with other organizations. This notion is incorporated into the SI model
and highlights innovation as a process that does not take place in isolation, but rather
in collaboration and interdependence with other organizations. 218 These organizations
may be other firms (suppliers, customers, etc.) or non-firms (universities, government
offices, etc.).219 The organization's behavior is shaped by laws, rules, norms and
routines referred to as “institutions.”220 The organizations and institutions are
components of a system for the creation and commercialization of knowledge. 221
Following Schumpeter, the SI model mainly stresses the leading role of the firm in the
innovation process, and the need for firms that do not have the substantial resources
required to develop in-house innovation to establish collaborations with other
organizations.222
Kline & Rosenberg, supra note 196, at 289-94.
Jan Fagerberg, Ben R. Martin & Esben S. Andersen, Innovation Studies: Towards a New
Agenda, in INNOVATION STUDIES: EVOLUTION AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 1, 6 (Jan Fagerberg, Ben R.
Martin & Esben Sloth Andersen eds., 2013).
215 Bengt-Åke
Lundvall, The Economics of Knowledge and Learning 9 (2003),
http://www.globelicsacademy.net/pdf/BengtAkeLundvall_1.pdf.
216 CHARLES
EDQUIST, SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION: TECHNOLOGIES, INSTITUTIONS AND
ORGANIZATIONS (1997).
217 Rothwell, supra note 202, at 11.
218 Kline & Rosenberg, supra note 196, at 289-94.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Charles Edquist, Systems of Innovation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION 181, 182
(Jan Fagerberg, David C. Mowery, Richard R. Nelson eds., 2005). Compare with Rothwell, supra note
202 (describing a similar model: “Systems Integration”, which emerged during the mid-1990s and is
still in effect, focusing on collaboration within a wider system—involving competitors, suppliers,
distributors, etc.). See also Roy Rothwell, Successful Industrial Innovation: Critical Factors for the
1990s, 22 R&D MGMT. 221 (1992).
222 Marinova & Phillimore, supra note 193, at 47.
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The economic evolutionary theory was a fertile ground for the development of the
SI approach, entered on the firm’s behavior. However, unlike the classical and
neoclassical theories it did not treat the firm as the sole entity engaged in innovation.
Additionally, it maintained that the firm's innovative behavior involves a wider range
of organizations that supply the knowledge and skills—underpinning the efforts of the
individual firm.223
The most well-known derivative of the SI model is the National System of
Innovation (“NSI”).224 A NSI is defined as a set of organizations which jointly and
individually contribute to the development and diffusion of new technologies and
institutions which provide a framework for the implementation of government policies
influencing the innovation process.225 The NSI concept is not confined to the national
level and can also be applied globally, 226 as well as to regions,227 sectors228 and
technologies.229
Another model explaining the innovation process that emerged alongside the SI
model was the Triple Helix (“TH”) model introduced by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff.230
According to this model, in increasingly knowledge-based societies, the university can
play an enhanced role in the innovation process. This innovation is dependent on
collaborations between the public, private and academic spheres, in order to create
new knowledge that will drive the innovation process.231
I view TH as a complementary framework to the SI model, by explaining or
describing the dynamics between the variety of institutional arrangements and policy
models that make up the NSI model.232 In other words, I see the TH model as an
elaborate explanation of the interactions between some of the organizations and
RICHARD R. NELSON, NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1993).
See CHRISTOPHER FREEMAN, TECHNOLOGY POLICY AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: LESSONS
FROM JAPAN (1987); BENGT-ÅKE LUNDVALL, NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION: TOWARDS A THEORY
OF INNOVATION AND INTERACTIVE LEARNING (1992); RICHARD R. NELSON, NATIONAL INNOVATION
SYSTEM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1993).
225 J. Stan Metcalfe, Technology Systems and Technology Policy in an Evolutionary Framework,
19 CAMB. J. ECON. 25, 38 (1995).
226 See Jennifer W. Spencer, Firms’ Knowledge-Sharing Strategies in the Global Innovation
System: Empirical Evidence from the Flat Panel Display Industry, 24 STRAT. MGMT. J. 217 (2003).
227 See Bjørn T. Asheim & Meric S. Gertle, The Geography of Innovation: Regional Innovation
Systems, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION 291 (Jan Fagerberg, David C. Mowery, Richard
R. Nelson eds., 2005). Regional systems of innovation are closely linked to the concept of innovative
milieu; see, e.g., Marinova & Phillimore, supra note 193, at 50-51.
228 See Keith Pavitt, Sectoral Patterns of Technical Change: Towards a Taxonomy and a Theory,
13 RES. POL’Y 343 (1984).
229 See Metcalfe, supra note 225.
230 See Loet Leydesdorff & Henry Etzkowitz Henry, The Triple Helix as a Model for Innovation
Studies, 25 SCI. & PUBLIC POL’Y 195 (1998); Henry Etzkowitz & Loet Leydesdorff, The Dynamics of
Innovation: From National Systems and “Mode 2” to a Triple Helix of University–Industry–
Government Relations, 29 RES. POL’Y 109 (2000) [hereinafter Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff (2000)]; Loet
Leydesdorff & Henry Etzkowitz, The Transformation Of University-Industry-Government Relations,
5 J. SOC. (2001), available at: http://www.sociology.org/content/vol005.004/th.html.
231 Henry Etzkowitz, Innovation in Innovation: The Triple Helix of University-IndustryGovernment Relations, 42 SOC. SCI. INFO. 293, 295-96 (2003); Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff (2000), supra
note 230, at 111-12; William P. Boland, et al., Collaboration and the Generation of New Knowledge in
Networked Innovation System: A Bibliometric Analysis, 52 PROCEDIA–SOC. & BEHAVIORAL SCI. 15, 16
(2012).
232 Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff (2000), supra note 230, at 109.
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institutions in the NSI’s “grand scheme.”233 This view is affirmed by Ranga and
Etzkowitz's new concept of Triple Helix Systems (“THS”).234 Whether one views SI as
a separate analytical framework from TH or sees the two as complementary
frameworks, one must recognize the emphasis these frameworks place on
collaboration. As such they are a stepping-stone for innovation scholars in
understanding the place of collaboration in the innovation process. 235
We see that the concept of cross-organizational collaboration was first introduced
to innovation theories during the 1990s with the emergence of SI and TH. I view this
change as an “evolution” of the theories, as they were initially centered on, following
Schumpeter's sequential view, the individual innovator or the sole firm. Much
emphasis is placed on the knowledge, skills and resources necessary for innovation.
The ability of an organization to identify, access, absorb, and use these is crucial for
innovation.236 The 1990s models recognize that knowledge, skills, and resources do
not reside in the firm itself, or only in other firms. They are widely distributed in the
innovation ecosystem, in various organizations operating in it, such as universities,
public research institutions, etc.
The interaction between firms and other
organizations is as important to the innovation production process as firm-to-firm
interactions. These interactions are at the center of the SI and TH models.237 Crossorganizational collaborations drive structural changes far beyond the scope of what
any one organization or person could do alone.238
The twenty first century introduces two other models aimed to provide a more
accurate explanation of the innovation production process. Quadruple and Quintuple
Helix239 emerged as an answer to the understanding that neither the TH nor SI model

233 However, the main criticism against the Triple Helix theory is that it tends to support a
perspective in which the DUI-mode of learning is neglected (Lundvall, supra note 206, at 15). For this
reason, amongst others, criticism has been heard more than once claiming that the Triple Helix
approach/model/theory is not suitable for developing countries or regions. See, e.g., Rhiannon Pugh,
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Triple Helix Policies and Programmes in Wales (Triple Helix
International
Conference
2013,
London
8th-10th
July
2013),
http://www.triplehelixconference.org/th/11/bic/docs/Papers/Pugh.pdf.
234 Marina Ranga & Henry Etzkowitz, Triple Helix Systems: An Analytical Framework for
Innovation Policy and Practice in the Knowledge Society, 27 INDUSTRY & HIGHER EDUC. 237 (2013).
235 Alongside SI and Triple Helix, a new paradigm emerged during the early years of the 21st
century. Open Innovation is understood to be the antithesis of the traditional vertical integration
model, also known as the ‘closed model of innovation.’ See Henry Chesbrough, Open Innovation: A
New Paradigm for Understanding Industrial Innovation, in OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW
PARADIGM 1 (Henry Chesbrough, Wim Vanhaverbeke & Joel West eds., 2006); Wim Vanhaverbeke,
The Inter-Organizational Context of Open Innovation, in OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW
PARADIGM 205 (Henry Chesbrough, Wim Vanhaverbeke & Joel West eds., 2006).
236 Marinova & Phillimore, supra note 193, at 47.
237 Jan Fagerberg, Ben R. Martin & Esben S. Andersen, Innovation Studies: Towards a New
Agenda, in INNOVATION STUDIES: EVOLUTION AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 1, 6-7 (Jan Fagerberg, Ben
R. Martin & Esben Sloth Andersen eds., 2013).
238 Martin Curley & Bror Salmelin, Open Innovation 2.0 Conference, Dublin, Ireland: A New
Paradigm 5 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=2
182.
239 Elias G. Carayannis & Ruslan Rakhmatullin, The Quadruple/Quintuple Innovation Helixes
and Smart Specialisation Strategies for Sustainable and Inclusive Growth in Europe and Beyond, 5
J. KNOWL. ECON. 212 (2014).
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addresses the multi-levelness of the knowledge-based economy.240 It has been argued
that the TH model does not take into account all the conditions necessary for long-term
growth.241
This Part summarizes the evolution of the innovation theories. The beginning
was modest; innovation was viewed as a sequential process, a macro view of the stages
leading to diffusion. Since the 1960s an effort was made to examine how innovation is
produced, what are the components, who are the actors and what needs to be done to
produce more innovation. While early models maintained the linearity aspects of the
sequential view, the twentieth-century brought along an understanding that
innovation is neither sequential nor linear, but collaborative and interactive.

V. THE INNOVATOR’S NEW IDENTITY: THE EMERGENCE OF THE ‘INNOVATIVE ENTITY’
This article sets out to examine if the patent system achieves its goal of
incentivizing innovation.242 In this Part, I argue that in light of the development of
innovation production theories there is a need to recognize the change in the
innovator's identity. This requires policymakers to rethink the incentives provided by
current U.S. patent system, if they still foster the creation of innovation.
A. Introducing the Innovative Entity
Following the historical review and the discussion of the theories of how the
patent system incentives inventors, I concluded that in the eyes of the law the
innovator image coincides with that of the inventor, thus bestowing her with
ownership of the protected technology.243 The focus has moved from the inventor being
the center of the innovation production process to the firm—as it also had the abilities
to conduct commercialization activities. But now it is understood that a complex
network of relationships between different organizations is required to produce
innovation. This complex network of relationships is comprised of cross-organizational
collaborations between different actors in the innovation ecosystem.
In light of these changes, I argue here that there is a need to recognize the new
image of the innovator, an identity that the Act must address. The point I wish to
make here is that the innovator cannot assume the individual inventor's identity

240 Elias G. Carayannis & David F. Campbell, Mode 3 Knowledge Production in Quadruple Helix
Innovation Systems Twenty-first-Century Democracy, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship for
Development, in 7 QUADRUPLE HELIX INNOVATION SYSTEMS, SPRINGER BRIEFS IN BUSINESS 1 (2012).
241 Cinzia Colapinto & Colin Porlezza, Innovation in Creative Industries: From the Quadruple
Helix Model to the Systems Theory, 3 J. KNOWL. ECON. 343 (2012).
242 Lawrence M. Sung, Collegiality and Collaboration in the Age of Exclusivity, 3 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 411, 412-3 (2000) (“At its heart, the patent system seeks to promote innovation by
providing inventors with an opportunity for pecuniary reward through the government grant of
temporary exclusionary rights in their inventions.”).
243 See also Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFFAIRS
31, 50 (1989).
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anymore, but today's innovator is in fact an innovative entity.244 This is not to say that
there are no individuals still inventing. Recognizing the emergence of the innovative
entity should not be on the expenses of the individual inventor. The system should
provide incentives to them both. This ‘innovative entity’ is comprised of actors
operating in the innovation ecosystem that have joint forces as part of a collaboration
in order to produce innovation. The ‘innovative entity’ is an entity of organizations,
each comprised of a large number of individuals—researchers, marketing personnel—
from different departments in the organization, working in collaboration amongst
themselves. This, however, does not pull the rug out from under my argument. While
the inventor may well still be the innovator, this is usually limited to certain fields in
which initial investment is not substantive, as in IT, where garage innovators can still
be found. Nevertheless, in scientific fields, research requires access to advanced
research tools, biological materials and equipped labs. It requires also highly educated
personnel.245 Though at times well equipped, it is a rare sight to see a scientist working
from home. Furthermore, an organization is more than the sum of the individuals
comprising it. Organizational knowledge base, its “memory” as referred to by some
scholars, comprises the sum of participating individuals' knowledge.246 Once this body
of knowledge is created, new people can use it and it survives people leaving the
organization.247 Some even argue that the sum of organizational knowledge exceeds
the sum of individuals.248 Hall explains that Nelson and Winter treat organizations as
“autonomous entities in their own rights, possessing transcendent knowledge,” which
is comprised of organizational experience. Nelson and Winter “specifically equate this

244 The proficient reader may notice that the term ‘innovative entity’ resembles the term
‘inventive entity’ used in the Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Under U.S. law an ‘inventive entity’ is
anyone other than the inventor, referring to either an individual person or a single organization.
245 For a discussion of what scientific research initials in the stem cell field in Israel, see Niva
Elkin-Koren, et al., Facilitating Collaboration in Stem Cell Research through Intellectual
Property (The Haifa Center for Law & Technology, University of Haifa, Faculty of Law in collaboration
with Samuel Neaman Institute for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology (Monograph))
[Hebrew],
available
at:
http://weblaw.haifa.ac.il/he/Research/ResearchCenters/techlaw/StemCells/publications/Documents/i
p_stem_cells_full_report.pdf.
246 Jillian Owen, Frada Burstein & William P. Hall, Knowledge Reuse in Project Management,
CONSTRUCTING THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY: METHODS AND TOOLS,
THEORY AND PRACTICE 443, 444; James P. Walsh & Gerardo R. Ungson, Organizational Memory, 16
ACADEMY MGMT. REV. 57, 61 (1991); RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY
THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982); WILLIAM P. Hall, Organizational Autopoiesis and Knowledge
Management 4 (ISD ‘03 Twelfth International Conference on Information Systems Development,
Melbourne,
Australia,
25-27
August
2003),
http://www.orgs-evolutionknowledge.net/Index/DocumentKMOrgTheoryPapers/Hall2003OrganizationalAutopoiesisKnowledge
Management.pdf.
247 Jillian Owen, Frada Burstein & William P. Hall, Knowledge Reuse in Project Management, in
CONSTRUCTING THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY: METHODS AND TOOLS,
THEORY AND PRACTICE 443. See James P. Walsh & Gerardo R. Ungson, Organizational Memory, 16
ACADEMY MGMT. REV. 57, 61 (1991).
248 RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE
(1982) WILLIAM P. Hall, Organisational Autopoiesis and Knowledge Management 4 (ISD ‘03 Twelfth
International Conference on Information Systems Development, Melbourne, Australia, 25-27 August,
2003),
http://www.orgs-evolution-knowledge.net/Index/DocumentKMOrgTheoryPapers/Hall2003
OrganizationalAutopoiesisKnowledgeManagement.pdf.
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to Polanyi's249 tacit knowledge,250 and note that such knowledge is built into the
constitutive structure of the organization and exists independently of individuals'
knowledge.”251 The organization's tacit knowledge is not attributed to its employees,
in the same sense as the inability of the employee to convey her tacit knowledge to her
replacement. The creation of a collaborative tacit knowledge, as part of the research
collaboration, not attributed to the individuals of cross-organizational collaboration,
strengthens the need to recognize the emergence of the innovative entity.
B. The Patent Act Under the Magnifying Glass
The reader may ask, and rightfully so, why should we be concerned as the Patent
Act has evolved. The current U.S. Patent Act includes section 262 that regulates the
situation of two or more patent owners:
JOINT OWNERS. In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each
of the joint owners of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the
patented invention within the United States, or import the patented
invention into the United States, without the consent of and without
accounting to the other owners.252
This section establishes the rights each partner has in the joint patent if there is
no prior agreement that governs the relationship between the partners. At first look
it seems that the law is flexible enough to accommodate the emergence of an innovative
entity. This understanding is supported by section 116, which regulates the situation
in which two or more inventors develop an invention jointly:
(a) JOINT INVENTIONS—When an invention is made by two or more
persons jointly, they shall apply for patent jointly and each make the required
oath, except as otherwise provided in this title. Inventors may apply for a
patent jointly even though
(1) they did not physically work together or at the same time,
(2) each did not make the same type or amount of contribution, or

NELSON & WINTER, supra note 248, at 104-05.
See, e.g., MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE REISSUE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL
PHILOSOPHY, The University of Chicago Press (1958).
251 WILLIAM P. Hall, Organizational Autopoiesis and Knowledge Management 4 (ISD ‘03 Twelfth
International Conference on Information Systems Development, Melbourne, Australia, 25-27 August
2003),
http://www.orgs-evolutionknowledge.net/Index/DocumentKMOrgTheoryPapers/Hall2003OrganizationalAutopoiesisKnowledge
Management.pdf. See NELSON & WINTER, supra note 248, at 106.
252 35 U.S.C. § 262 (emphasis added).
249
250
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(3) each did not make a contribution to the subject matter of every claim of
the patent.253
The above section seemingly supports the notion that the Act is broad enough to
accommodate the emergence of the innovative entity. The 1984 Amendment to the
Act254 added sub-sections (1)-(3) as a way to clarify the joint inventorship
requirements.255 The use of the word ‘inventorship’ comes from the term ‘inventive
entity’ used in the Act. Unlike the innovative entity, however, an inventive entity
refers to co-inventors that are viewed as separate individuals and it is an artificial
term that does not constitute the levels of commitment the notion of innovative entity
denotes, as I discuss below.256 Congress amended the Patent Act to codify prior case
law.257 Prior to the 1984 Amendment courts were in disagreement as to the
circumstances under which joint inventorship existed. The result was conflicting case
law as different courts had articulated different standards. 258 What was never
disputed was the courts' requirement of collaboration between the co-inventors.259 The
conflict was with regard to the extent of this alleged collaboration. The two conflicting
standards were the “all claims” rule and the “non-all claims” rule.260 The “all claims”
rule required each inventor to contribute to every claim in the patent.261 The “non-all
claims” rule allowed for joint inventorship when different inventors had contributed to
different claims, as long as they met the other requirements of inventorship and their
contributions resulted in one invention.262 The 1984 Amendments enacted the “non-

35 U.S.C. § 116.
The Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984 (Pub. L. No. 98-622, § 104(a), 98 Stat. 3383, 338485 (1984)).
255 Joint inventorship is widely considered to be arbitrary and lacking coherent standards. See
Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357, 1372 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (explaining that
joint inventorship is “one of the muddiest concepts in . . . patent law”). As I further explain in this
Part, I doubt that the amendment did clarify what this term entails.
256 Monheit, supra note 20, at 192.
257 130 CONG. REC. 28, 073 (1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
258 David W. Carstens, Joint Inventorship Under 35 U.S.C. § 116, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 616, 618 (1991); Monheit, supra note 20, at 202.
259 David W. Carstens, Joint Inventorship Under 35 U.S.C. § 116, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 616, 625-26 (1991).
260 Joshua Matt, Searching for an Efficacious Joint Inventorship Standard, 44 B.C.L. REV. 245,
257-58 (2002).
261 Rival Mfg. Co. v. Dazey Prod. Co., 358 F. Supp. 91, 101, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 432, 439 (W.D.
Mo. 1973) (“[Independent mechanical features that are . . . separate claims in a patent, although
incorporated in a single machine, remain separate and distinct inventions.”); Stewart v. Tenk, 32 F.
665, 666 (C.C.S.D. IMI1. 887) (stating that because the inventors had not co-invented the claim at
issue they were not joint inventors and a separate patent should have been issued to the sole inventor
of that claim, as “a joint patent can be sustained only for a joint invention.”); Ex parte Martin, 215
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 543, 544 (P.T.O.B. App. 1981) (reciting that joint inventorship requires “that every
claim of an application be a product of the same inventive entity.”).
262 SAB Industri AB v. Bendix Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 95, 104 (E.D. Va. 1978) (clarifying that
joint inventors do not have to combine their efforts as to each claim in the patent); Vekamaf HoUand
B.V. v. Pepe Benders, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 955, 966 (D. Minn. 1981) (holding that under the “nonall claims” rule joint inventorship for patents is recognized “even if all of the joint inventors did not
contribute to each and every one of the claims.”).
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all claims” rule by providing three cases that would not disqualify one from being a
joint inventor.263
In the following paragraphs I maintain that section 116, along with section 262,
does not provide the Act with the flexibility required to recognize the emergence of the
innovative entity.
1. Conception is Only Half of an Innovation
It is quite obvious from section 116’s wording that the Act views the inventor as
an individual that can co-invent with other individuals. This is in line with other
sections of the Act, as discussed in Part II.C, and is hardly a surprise.
The individual attribute of the Act is not restricted to its wording alone, but also
has an influence on the courts' interpretation. It is the reason for the courts' emphasis
on the ‘conception step.’ The inventive process has two parts: conception and reduction
to practice.264 Courts place emphasis primarily on the conception of the invention. 265
Conception is the stage in which the inventor conceives of the solution to a problem,
which constitutes the subject matter of the invention. 266 After the 1984 Amendment,
it was determined who the inventor is based on the question: who conceived the subject
matter of at least one patent claim. An inventor is not required anymore to contribute
to each of the patent claims. The rationale is “[b]ecause an inventorship determination
focuses on the invention claimed and not merely described in a patent, the first step in
an inventorship analysis is to determine the scope and meaning of the claims.” 267 The
problem with courts' focus on the conception stage is that they are missing the purpose
of the patent system.
263 Joshua Matt, Searching for an Efficacious Joint Inventorship Standard, 44 B.C. L. REV. 245,
257-58 (2002).
264 Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(““Conception is the ‘formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the
complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice.’” Hybritech, Inc. v.
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376, 231 U.S.P.Q. 81, 87 (Fed.Cir. 1986) (quoting
1 ROBINSON ON PATENTS 532 (1890)). An idea is sufficiently “definite and permanent” when “only
ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive research or
experimentation.” Burroughs Wellcome v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228. See also Sean B.
Seymore,, Atypical Inventions, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2057, 2066 (2011) (“The inventive process has two
steps: conception and reduction to practice.”); George M. Sirilla, How the Federal Circuit Clarified the
“Muddy Concept” of Joint Inventorship, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 509, 514 (2009) (“invention
under the patent statute comprises conception and reduction to practice”).
265 Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1227-28 (“Conception is the touchstone of inventorship, the
completion of the mental part of invention”); Monsanto Co. v. Kamp, 269 F. Supp. 818, 824, 154
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 259, 262 (D.D.C. 1967) (“Each [inventor] needs to perform but a part of the task if an
invention emerges from all of the steps taken together. It is not necessary that the entire inventive
concept should occur to each of the joint inventors, or that the two should physically work on the
project together.”).
266 Sherry L. Murphy, Determining Patent Inventorship: A Practical Approach, 13 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. 215, 227 (2012) (“Conception, the “touchstone of inventorship,” is the mental part of invention,
the brain intensive problem-solving that goes on inside an inventor’s mind as a problem and potential
solutions are considered in detail.”).
267 Patrick G. Gattari, Determining Inventorship for US Patent Applications, 17 INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. L.J. 16, 16 (2005).
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The reduction to practice step that was briefly indicated above is the heart of the
innovation process. Innovation ends with the diffusion of the product or process across
the potential market. Burroughs Wellcome Co., v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., Novopharm,
Inc. and Novopharm Ltd.268 is the leading case on the question of how to determine
joint inventorship where one person (or persons) has (or have) the initial idea and
another aids in its reduction to practice. 269 This general description is actually the
purpose for which actors in the innovation ecosystem enter collaboration.
Collaboration grants access to additional or previously unavailable expertise, prior
knowledge, scarce biological materials, expensive research tools, and other capabilities
needed to compete in changing markets. Through collaboration, duplication of efforts
can be avoided. But it also leads to better utilization of resources. Collaboration
prevents scientists from investing resources only to find out that the technology they
have been working on vigorously already exists, developed by another research
group.270 Collaboration also has an important social aspect: the creation of new
innovation, which is beneficial to society and serves both as an incentive to enter
collaboration and as an important benefit.271
In Burrough Wellcome, the court stated that the conception requirement does not
include knowledge that the invention will work, such knowledge is part of the
reduction to practice.272 I postulate that courts' interpretation of section 116 and their
focus on the conception step prevents the Act from recognizing the emergence of the
innovative entity, thus not providing sufficient incentives.
It is true that not every invention ends with an innovation. However, patents are
granted for inventive technologies with a commercial promise. 273 Patents are directly
related to technological novelty.274 For this reason, the reduction step should not be
overlooked, especially when taking into account the aim of the patents system to foster
268 Burroughs Wellcome Co., v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., Novopharm, Inc. and Novopharm Ltd., 40
F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
269 George M. Sirilla, How the Federal Circuit Clarified the “Muddy Concept” of Joint
Inventorship, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 509, 511 (2009).
270 Talya Ponchek, Does the Patent System Promote Scientific Innovation? Empirical Analysis of
Patent Forward Citations, 25 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 289, 304-305 (2015). See also Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 1161, 1161-67 (2000) (noting the increased value of collaboration in today’s research
environment, arguing that the current prevalence and value of collaborative work product stems from
a number of factors: intense specialization of many scientists, necessitating collaboration; the
globalization of the marketplace; new avenues, particularly the Internet, that ease collaboration; the
rise in use of transient expert collaborators such as consultants; the expansion of intellectual property
rights; and the need to encourage highly accomplished experts to collaborate.). For an elaborate
discussion of the benefits see Talya Ponchek, Collaboration in Scientific R&D: Patent-Based
Innovation Indicators Analysis Evidence from Stem Cell Research in Israel 113-41 (doctoral thesis,
University of Haifa, 2015) (on file with University of Haifa Library) [hereinafter Ponchek (2015)].
271 See, e.g., Sung, supra note 242, at 419 (“To be sure, the social aspects of collaboration play no
small role. The rewards of interaction do not culminate with the successful completion of an
innovative endeavor.”).
272 Burroughs Wellcome Co., v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., Novopharm, Inc. and Novopharm Ltd., 40
F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
273 See, e.g., Keith Smith, Measuring Innovation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION 148,
159 (Jan Fagerberg, David C. Mowery & Richard R. Nelson eds., 2005).
274 Sung, supra note 242, at 413 (“The inherent emphasis on innovation is reflected in the
statutory conditions for obtaining a patent, which prescribe that inventions may be patented only if
they are useful, new, and nonobvious in view of known technology referred to as prior art.”).
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and generate innovation. If the focus of the Act is not both conception and reduction
to practice, then the act misses its purpose. That raises concerns not just with regard
to its ability to incentivize the innovative entity, but more importantly to provide
sufficient incentives to form the innovation entity.
2. Joint, not in collaboration
The innovative entity is the result of a collaboration between two or more
organizations operating in an innovation ecosystem with an understanding that in
order to be innovative they require access to resources and capabilities other
organizations hold.
Courts have interpreted the term ‘joint’ in section 116 (which also appears in
section 262) as requiring collaboration.275 I suggest that the courts' interpretation
reveals they actually require some jointness which does not amount to collaboration.276
Collaboration is the highest level of jointness. It is this type of jointness that holds
together the innovative entity. Elsewhere I offer a typology of characteristics of joint
activities.277 Each of these activities is different due to its level of ‘jointness.’
Collaboration is the most advanced activity, usually characterized by high levels of
mutual attachment to pursue individual and collective benefits, 278 like equity joint
ventures or research joint ventures.279 It involves the bringing together of previously
separated organizations into a new organizational texture, with full commitment to a
common mission, shared planning, formal communication across multiple levels,
pooled and jointly secured resources, shared rewards and products. 280 It is an activity
that involves a process with beginning, middle and end components and thus is
expected to evolve, change and develop over time. 281 Collaboration can lead to the
creation a new entity such as a spin-off or subsidiary respectively. 282 The partners
usually enter collaboration to develop a radical innovation based on their common
275 Monsanto Co. v. Kamp, 269 F. Supp. 818, 824, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 259, 262 (D.D.C. 1967) (“A
joint invention is the product of collaboration of the inventive endeavors of two or more persons
working toward the same end and producing an invention by their aggregate efforts.”).
276 See, e.g., McDavid, supra note 19, at 451 (“In 1984, Congress amended the statute in an
attempt to account for joint work efforts, yet, even today, it lacks a qualitative or quantitative
guideline regarding the type of inventive contribution required to qualify as a joint inventor.”).
277 ’Collaboration’ is a complex and intricate term, and an attempt to define it should be the
subject of a separate paper. I attempt to do so in Ponchek (2015), supra note 270, at 73-112. This
discussion includes a review of the confusion in the literature surrounding the difference between
‘collaboration’ and other joint activities, which led to abundant definitions and meanings to the term
‘collaboration.’
278 See Chris Huxham, Collaboration and Collaborative Advantage, in CREATING COLLABORATIVE
ADVANTAGE 1 (Chris Huxham ed., 1996); Arthur Turovh Himmelman, Rationales and Contexts for
Collaboration, in CREATING COLLABORATIVE ADVANTAGE 19 (Chris Huxham ed., 1996).
279 Ponchek (2016), supra note 5, at 85-112
280 Arthur T. Himmelman, On Coalitions and the Transformation of Power Relations:
Collaborative Betterment and Collaborative Empowerment, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNITY
PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2001, 277-284, 277.
281 Laurie K. Lewis, Collaborative Interaction: Review of Communication Scholarship and a
Research Agenda, in 30 COMMUNICATION YEARBOOK 174, 174-89 (Christina S. Back ed., 2006).
282 Steve Cropper, Collaborative Working and the Issue of Sustainability, in CREATING
COLLABORATIVE ADVANTAGE 80, 82 (Chris Huxham ed., 1996).
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beliefs, conviction and vision.283 On a continuum of joint activities, collaboration is the
most complex and advanced form of a joint activity.284 As section 116 does not account
for collaboration, but a general situation of joint work, it does not provide incentives to
collaborate and form an innovative entity needed for the advancement of innovation.
Some may say that the Amendment does sit with the reality of an innovative
entity in the sense that it recognizes that not every partner is required to make the
same contribution. However, the cases described in sub-sections 116(1)-(3) do not
provide as much substantive support as one would have hoped. In our day and age
collaborative researchers’ endeavors do not rely on researchers being from the same
lab or the same organization, or even contribute the same amount or type of
contribution. What seemed as cutting edge in 1984, is viewed today as the norm.
Though courts are correct in stating that partners are not required to work at the
same location or at the same time, the willingness to challenge the classic premise of
jointness which they view as ‘collaboration,’ will fall short in the sense that their
definition of ‘collaboration’ does not take into account the high levels of commitment
partners have to one another. In the eyes of the courts, collaboration entails some
element of joint behavior, such as “working under common direction;”285 when one
inventor sees a relevant report and builds upon it, or when one inventor hears
another’s suggestion at a meeting.286 The level of commitment in these examples is
unclear. They stand for actions that may initiate collaboration. But the question of
sustaining it, resulting with joint research output is not taken into account. This
conclusion is further emphasized in light of section 262, as discussed below.
Moreover, the cases described in subsections 116(1)-(3) are a closed list that does
not take into account other common situations, such as the collaboration between a
firm and a university research lab, whereas the firm provides monetary support. 287
The fact that no labor was done on the firm's part does not change the meaning of the
relationship and the levels of commitment, and it is still considered a collaboration.
This example may lead to the unreasonable outcome that the firm would not be
considered the owner of the joint patent, as section 116 establishes the identity of the
283 BARBARA GRAY, COLLABORATING: FINDING COMMON GROUNDS FOR MULTIPARTY PROBLEMS
(1989); Barbara Gray, Cross-Sectoral Partners: Collaborative Alliance among Business, Government
and Communities, in CREATING COLLABORATIVE ADVANTAGE 59, 61 (Chris Huxham ed., 1996).
284 In short, other joint activities are networks, coordination and cooperation. These differ from
one another and from collaboration in the texture of the joint activity, in the level of dependency
between the partners, the commitment for sharing risks and profits, etc. Real life examples of
coordination are cluster and consortium. Alliance is an example of cooperation. On a continuum of
joint activities networks is on the one hand and collaboration is on the other. Ponchek (2015), supra
note 270, at 98-112.
285 Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib.Co., 973 F.2d 911, 917 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
286 Id.
287 See, e.g., Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr., Public-Private Partnerships in Biomedical Research:
Resolving Conflicts of Interest Arising Under the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, 4 J.L. &
HEALTH 1, 8 (1990) (explaining relationship between federal laboratories and a company (“firm”)
under the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Cooperative Research and Development Agreements
(“CRADAs”): “[A] government scientist collaborates on a specified research project with a company
scientist (the ‘investigators’). The company might also fund one or more research fellows to work with
the government’s principal investigator on the research project. The company may also contribute
other resources, such as additional research scientists, supplies or operating expenses. In exchange
for this support and participation, the company obtains rights-typically an exclusive license or an
option to an exclusive license-in any invention produced under the collaboration.”).

[16:66 2016]

The Emergence of the Innovative Entity:
Is the Patent System Left Behind?

105

(first) owners by stating the joint inventors “shall apply for a patent jointly.” 288
Seemingly, as the firm does not contribute inventorship to the mix, it is not entitled to
claim ownership in the joint invention. I now turn to discuss section 262.
3. Ramifications of the Scope of Contribution to the Conception
The conception stage, discussed in Part V.B.1, is also used by the courts to identify
if an invention is the product of a sole inventor or of joint inventorship, i.e., more than
one inventor contributes to its conception. 289 The importance of determining the
identity of a co-inventor has to do with the link between inventorship and ownership.
A patent is granted to the only true and original inventor. 290 Section 261 ties
inventorship with ownership; the applicant is the inventor, unless the rights were
assigned: “The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like
manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or
patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United States . . . .”291
Section 262 regulates situations of co-ownership. The courts' decisions regarding
the co-inventor effects the identity of the co-owners respectively. Prior to the 1984
Amendments, co-inventorship was determined according to one of the two standards
discussed in Part V.A.292 The standard of “all claims” denotes that joint inventors have
equal and undivided interests in the patent. This presumption was based upon the
‘partnership theory.’293 If joint inventors were “members of a ‘partnership,’ whereby
they expended equal amounts of inventive effort and shared in the success or failure
of their project, then a rule providing equal interests in any resulting patent seemed
entirely equitable.”294 With the enactment of the 1984 Amendment, which expressly
rejected the “all claims” rule, the partnership theory could no longer be used as a
justification for the grant of equal and undivided interests for co-inventors.295 The
main problem with the partnership theory was the requirement of equal amounts of
288 See, e.g., Andrew B. Dzeguze, Avoiding the “Fifth Beatle” Syndrome: Practical Solutions to
Minimizing Joint Inventorship Exposure, 6 J. MARSHELL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 645, 663-70 (2007)
(discussing four types of situations that can result in co-inventorship (intra-company collaborations,
inter-company collaborations, company collaborations with universities, and mentor-student
collaborations at universities) that seem to pre-dominate the case law and suggesting practical steps
which can avoid such disputes from arising, with particular emphasis on the unique attributes of each
scenario. The author claims that despite being generally good business, these situations crate
difficulties due to the unclear legal standard of inventorship is section 116 (but also due to the lack of
basic good manner and problematic ethical conduct of the partners)).
289 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 266, at 228-29.
290 35 U.S.C. § 101.
291 35 U.S.C. § 261.
292 See supra notes 260-261 and accompanying text.
293 Dale L. Carlson & James R. Barney, Who Owns What’s in Your Patent?, INTELL. PROP. TODAY
(1998), available at: http://www.wiggin.com/4689.
294 Id.
295 Id. (stating that since the enactment of the 1984 Amendment, the “all claims” rule “was
effectively overruled by statute, and thus, the ‘partnership’ theory of joint inventorship was completely
eviscerated.”); Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(stating that after the 1984 Amendments to section 116, “the legal premise that each named person
had made a full and equal contribution to the entire patented invention became obsolete”).
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inventorship, while in real-life the situation is quite different. The purpose of the 1984
Amendment was to “recognize the realities of modem team research.” 296 This makes
sense as inventive efforts are rarely a solitary endeavor in most modern industries.
Different forms of joint activities, including collaboration, are commonplace. 297 To this
end, the Amendment specifically recites three situations in which joint inventorship is
not precluded. The criticism, however, has to do with section 116, stating what would
not disqualify one from being a joint inventor, but not providing a definition of what is
joint inventorship.298
Even if we were willing to say that section 116 accommodates collaboration and
provides sufficient incentives to establish the innovative entity and generate
innovation, section 262 prevents us from stipulating that assumption.
The
Amendment remained silent as to the rule in section 262. 299 The purpose of section
262 originally was to make sure the protected technology is commercialized thus
benefiting not only the patentee but also society. 300 The co-inventor, however, is
recognized as one and she is entitled to use the patented invention as she desires,
without the need to acquire her partner's prior consent. 301 Even if we were ready to
reject the premise of the difference between joint and collaboratively and say that
section 116 in its current form is broad enough to view inventorship as the outcome of
an innovative entity’s work, section 262 pulls the rug out from underneath this
argument.
Determining inverntorship in a collaboration is difficult as it entails interactions
between different research groups in the same institution and between different

130 CONG. REC. 28,073 (1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
David W. Carstens, Joint Inventorship Under 35 U.S.C. § 116, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 616, 617 (1991).
298 Id. at 619 (“However, rather than providing a definition of “joint inventor”, the foregoing
paragraph merely lists the factors which shall not preclude a joint inventorship.”). See also, George
M. Sirilla, How the Federal Circuit Clarified the “Muddy Concept” of Joint Inventorship, 91 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 509, 510 (2009).
299 Dale L. Carlson & James R. Barney, The Division of Rights Among Joint Inventors: Public
Policy Concerns After Ethicon v. U.S. Surgical, 39 IDEA 251, 260 (1999). See also, Joshua Matt,
Searching for an Efficacious Joint Inventorship Standard, 44 B.C. L. REV. 245, 270 (2002) (“This
discord, originating from the 1984 amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 116, has had effects that are in some
instances directly contrary to the explicit Congressional intent of those amendments.”); and McDavid,
supra note 19, at 453 (“The inequity of permitting equal ownership interests for unequal contributions
is the foundation of controversy in joint inventorship/ownership law and enhances the significance of
distinguishing true inventive contributions from non-qualifying efforts.”).
300 See, e.g., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COLLABORATIVE
RESEARCH 17 (2005), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl33063.pdf (“The policy basis for this
rule appears to be premised upon creating the maximum opportunity for the patented technology to
be exploited in the marketplace . . . The tenancy-in-common relationship also prevents one of many
joint owners from a patent form “holding up” the entire transaction by demanding additional royalties
or other consideration.”).
301 Section 262 raises other concerns which exceeds the scope of this article, but are worth
mentioning even in a nutshell as they lead to absurd results. The main example is of an inventor
granting a license to a competitor of the other co-owner(s). In Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical
Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1998) the case was even more absurd as Ethicon discovered after
the co-inventor refused to join in the infringement suit against the plaintiff that the co-inventor was
the one who had granted a license to the infringer-defendant Surgical Corp.
296
297
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organizations.302 The line as to who has done what, who contributed what, and how
much is vague, hence the need to recognize a singular uniformed entity.303 This would
certainly justify maintaining a standard similar to the ‘partnership theory’ in section
262;304 non-specified inventorship leads to inclusive ownership of the patent, i.e.
ownership does not rely on the amount or type of inventorship each of the organizations
comprising it has contributed. According to section 262, however, an inventor can
license the patent without the permission of the other co-inventor(s) as many times as
he or she desires, thereby reducing the value of the invention. This is especially
worrisome if we think about an innovative entity which was established as part of a
collaboration between a firm and a university.
If the firm, which has the
commercialization abilities that the university lacks, utilizes the patent, what gain
would be left to the university?
Section 262 does not provide the necessary incentives to initiate collaboration and
establish an innovative entity. The wording seems to defeat the purpose of
establishing a collaboration, as it views joint ownership as a situation within each
partner is free to use the patented invention as they desire. While this may be true in
a more loosely joint activity such as a network (though it is usually unlikely that a
network will lead to the creation of an invention),305 it is not the case in collaboration.
An innovative entity is created by cross-organizational collaborations. How can
policymakers advance the initiation of collaborations and promote innovation
production by the innovative entity, if the law does not even define the activity it is
designate to advance?
The concerns regarding the Act's ability to achieve its goal run even deeper.
Section 262 serves as an impediment to the initiation of collaboration, but more
importantly it is a representation of a property regime that does not sit with the reality
of an innovative entity. In the next Part the article explains why a Libertarian
property regime, as manifested in the Patent Act, hinders innovation production.

302 Carstens, supra note 297, at 617 (“Often this collaboration is immediate and well documented.
Other times, ideas generated within multinational firms may circulate over the course of years by
inter-office memo or newsletter.”). But cf. Sean B. Seymore, My Patent, Your Patent, or Our Patent?
Inventorship Disputes Within Academic Research Groups, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 125, 135 (2006).
303 Eric Ross Cohen, Clear as Mud:
An Empirical Analysis of the Developing Law of Joint
Inventorship in the Federal Circuit, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 383, 385 (2013) (“[J]oint inventorship
law attempts to apply the vague standard requirements of inventorship to the expansive variety of
collaborative scenarios in which multiple parties are involved in the inventive process.”). See, e.g.,
Brian M. Gaff, Who Invents What?, COMPUTING & THE LAW 10, 11 (2013) (“Determining when there is
collaboration that gives rise to joint inventorship can be difficult. This issue has been vigorously
litigated in many cases.”).
304 But cf. Matt, supra note 263, 274-86 (offering to amend the joint inventorship rule under
section 116, as oppose to most proposals that have focused on procedural solutions or on the law of
joint ownership under section 262).
305 See Ponchek (2015), supra note 270, at 98-112, for a discussion of networks and their place on
the continuum of joint activities (Networks are “informal relationships [between institutions] that
denote lack of any form of organization”). Id. at 99.
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C. Is it Time for a New Property Regime?
In this Part, I take a step back from the various sections of the Patent Act and
provide a bird's eye view of the property regime. So far I postulated that the Act does
not provide sufficient incentives to initiate collaboration and establish an innovative
entity. The establishment of such entity is necessitated by the creation and
development of new innovations. This Part reviews the property regime at the basis
of the Patent Act. I claim here that the lack of incentives is not only the result of the
wording of the Act, but more importantly the libertarian property regime of the Act.
Patents are property.306 The Patent Act itself clearly and unambiguously states
that. Section 261 affirms as follows: “Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall
have the attributes of personal property.”307 The point I wish to make here is that
the property regime under U.S. patent system is Libertarian. Libertarianism was
developed in the seventeenth century as an answer to monarchs and aristocrats reign,
who lived off the productive labor of other people. Libertarians defended the right of
people to keep the fruits of their labor. 308 John Locke,309 Adam Smith,310 David
Hume,311 Thomas Paine312 and Thomas Jefferson are prominent examples of
Libertarians thinkers.313 The purpose of this Part is not to provide a comprehensive
survey of the development of the concept of Libertarianism. Instead, I stress a single
point: Our current understanding of property is of ownership by a single individual,
whereas what we should be discussing is a non-specific, inclusive collaborative
ownership.314
David Boaz explains that libertarianism is “the view that each person has the
right to live his life in any way he chooses so long as he respects the equal rights of
others . . .[Libertarianism] defend each person's right to life, liberty, and property—
rights that people possess naturally . . . .”315 The concepts of property and liberty are
closely tied, if not intertwined.316
Libertarianism is a different concept than
liberalism. Unlike liberals, libertarians believe in individual freedom and limited
government consistently.317 The notion of individual freedom is based on the view of
the individual as the basic unit of social analysis. Only individuals make choices and
are responsible for their actions. Libertarians accept the basic rights that liberals do
– individual liberties, individual rights and individual freedom. They add to the mix
306 Greive, supra note 16, at 1346 (“A patent or patent application has the attributes of personal
property and is thus freely assignable”).
307 35 U.S.C. § 261 (emphasis added).
308 DAVID BOAZ, LIBERTARIANISM : A PRIMER 17-18 (1997).
309 See supra Part III.
310 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1976); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS (1976).
311 DAVID
HUME,
A
TREATISE
OF
HUMAN
NATURE
(1769),
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm.
312 THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN (1791).
313 Boaz, supra note 308, at 17. Though at their respective time, they were each considered a
liberal. Id. at 40.
314 The term collaborative here denotes to the levels of commitment between the partners. See
supra note 280 and accompanying text.
315 Boaz, supra note 308, at 2.
316 HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY ON A CROSSROAD 37 (2005) [Hebrew].
317 Boaz, supra note 308, at 21; see id. at 22, for helpful figure.
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more liberties, namely, absolute freedom of contract and of property. However, given
the absolute terms in which libertarians define these rights, as Samuel Freeman
articulates, libertarians come to occupy a predominant position and in effect eliminate
any need (in libertarians' minds) for basic rights and for liberal institution.318 Freeman
explains that the problem is these added liberties, when combined with the libertarian
account of self-ownership, undermine the idea of basic liberties. For what libertarian
self-ownership ultimately means is all rights are conceived as property rights. Rights
to liberties then become just one among several kinds of rights that persons own and
have at their disposal. Basic liberties are of no greater moral or in comparison to other
kinds of property rights.319
Libertarian thought emphasizes the dignity of each individual, which entails both
rights and responsibility. Because individuals are moral agents, they have a right to
be secure in their life, liberty, and property.320 These rights are not granted by
government or by society; they are inherent in the nature of human beings. Of course
libertarians support the formation of a government, however, as government is a
dangerous institution, it is limited in nature—to protect individuals' rights.
Libertarianism does not a claim that people can do anything they want to. Rather, as
Boaz explains, libertarianism proposes a society of liberty under law, in which
individuals are free to pursue their own lives so long as they respect the equal rights
of others.321 The rule of law means that individuals are governed by generally
applicable and spontaneously developed legal rule, not by arbitrary commands, and
that those rules should protect the freedom of individuals to pursue happiness in their
own ways, and not aim at any particular result or outcome.322 Libertarians also
contend that to survive and to flourish, individuals need to engage in economic activity.
Libertarians believe that people will be both freer and more prosperous if government
intervention in people's economic choices is minimized. Free markets are the economic
system of free individuals, and they are necessary to create wealth.323
Libertarianism is considered to be a basic framework for societies in which free
individuals can live together in peace and harmony, pursuing constant improvements,
advance science, technology, and standard of living.324 The problem, however, is that
the notion of every person as a unique individual who owns himself or herself led to
the negation of other ownership possibilities besides self-ownership.
A property right is a human right of an individual to use and dispose of property
that he has justly acquired. These rights stem from the one fundamental right of selfownership, our ownership of our own bodies. 325 This does not coincide with the
emergence of the innovative entity. The focus remains on the individual, though
decisions are made on the entity level. The unit of decision making is now the entity
and not the individual, which is comprised from several organizations and their
personnel. Libertarians recognize that humans are social beings and that being part
318 Samuel Freeman, Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View, 30 PHIL.
& PUB. AFFAIRS 105, 123 (2001).
319 Id. at 131.
320 Boaz, supra note 308, at 16.
321 HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY ON A CROSSROAD 37 (2005) [Hebrew].
322 Id. at 17.
323 Id.
324 Id. at 57.
325 Id. at 68.
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of society has its benefits. 326 Individuals benefit greatly from their interactions with
other individuals. Libertarians refer to this as ‘cooperation.’327 However, their
understanding of cooperation is limited to entering contracts with others, 328 whom they
live and work with, which is a basic human right resulting from the individual's selfownership.329 Boaz describes the problem, that for libertarians, the basic unit of social
analysis is the individual.330 It cannot be anything else as individuals are, in all cases,
the source and foundation of creativity, activity, and society. According to this,
libertarian line of thinking, groups do not have plans or intentions. For this reason,
only individuals are seen as capable of choice, in the sense of anticipating the outcomes
of alternative courses of action and weighing the consequences. Though individuals
create and deliberate in groups at times, the individual mind is still, according to
libertarianism, responsible for the choices made, because only individuals can take
responsibility for their actions.331
As stated above, the individual is the unit of value, and the liberty of the
individual is the essential precondition for human flourishing. Libertarianism is
based on this notion and thus, negates the possibility of collaborative ownership. 332
The U.S. Patent Act fulfills this libertarian objective of individual's self-ownership.
Locke explains to a T the point I try to make here through the following examples:
And the taking of this or that part doesn't depend on the express consent
of all the commoners. Thus when my horse bites off some grass, my
servant cuts turf, or I dig up ore, in any place where I have a right to these
in common with others, the grass or turf or ore becomes my property,
without anyone’s giving it to me or consenting to my having it. My
labour in removing it out of the common state it was in has established me
as its owner. If the explicit consent of every commoner was needed for anyone
to appropriate to himself any part of what is given in common, children

326 Id. at 96 (referring to the benefits of what Adam Smith called the Great Society, the complex
and productive society made possible by social interaction).
327 Though I do not go into details, in Part Error! Reference source not found., I discuss the
difference between joint and collaboratively. Cooperation does not describe accurately neither
libertarians understanding of the role of society nor the essence of an inventive entity as I further
discuss.
328 Boaz, supra note 295, at 132 (“The result is a complex network of free association in which
people voluntarily assume and fulfill obligations and contracts . . . The result is that diverse and
unfamiliar people come together in fellowship”). The loose and voluntary notion of these
arrangements deny the recognition of any collaboration, as collaboration requires high levels of
commitment between partners. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
329 It is this complete contract freedom that Nozick warns about, and gives the extreme example
of a person to sell himself into slavery as it is a system that support freedom of entering into contracts
as part of the individual self-ownership. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 283, 331
(1974). This is closely related to concerns raised by Freeman. See supra note 300 and accompanying
text; Freeman, supra note 318, at 132-34.
330 Boaz, supra note 308, at 95.
331 Id.
332 Locke discusses “common ownership” and explains how property that is held in common does
not realize the notion of individual liberties. LOCKE, supra note 140, at § 28-29 (“taking any part of
what is common and removing it from the state nature leaves it in creates ownership; and if it didn’t,
the common would be of no use.”).
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couldn't cut into the meat their father had provided for them in common
without saying which child was to have which portion.333
If we read section 262 again, we see that it raises the same point Locke was
making in the above paragraph. Section 262 provides that in the absence of previous
agreement between the partners, one partner can invoke her property right in the
patent without requiring the other partner's consent. Furthermore, case law has
extended section 262 to include the situation in which each partner licenses the
invention without recourse to the other partners, effectively precluding the grant of an
exclusive license in cases of joint ownership unless all the partners agree not to grant
any further licenses or to work the invention themselves.334 Similarly, one partner has
the right to impede the other partner’s ability to sue infringers by refusing to
voluntarily join in such a suit.335 The problem is that while Locke provides a rationale
for the need to bestow individuals with private property, section 262 governs the
relationship between joint owners. Nonetheless, the resemblance between each of
these different texts support and strengthen the point I wish to make in this article.
Section 262 does not incentivize collaboration which is required in order to incentivize
the creation of an innovative entity, as it actually denotes an individual's selfownership. If this section had established a requirement to receive the other partners'
prior consent, it would not have gratified the principles of libertarianism.
One should also draw her attention to the fact that some libertarians reject
natural rights as a basis for their views. They base their notion of self-ownership on
utilitarian theory.336 This, however, does not influence the point I wish to make. First,
even the libertarian-utilitarians reach the same conclusion with regard to private
property. Second, utilitarian theory is used to justify the need for a patent system and
the incentive it provides the inventor/innovator.
Granted, the discussion in this Part is only relevant as long as there is no prior
agreement between the partners that governs their collaborative relationship.
However, an agreement, as elaborate as it may be, cannot foresee all possible
situations that may arise. Thus, the letter of the law may prevail. Furthermore,
science is still the realm of scientists and not attorneys. In some cases, the legal team
joins in a later stage, after the collaboration was already established, or only when a
dispute arises between the parties. These are also situations in which the letter of the
law dictates the outcome. Finally, and most importantly, the law is used by
policymakers to signal practitioners which strategies they should adopt to increase
innovation production.

Id. § 28-29 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Willingham v. Star Cutter Co., 194 U.S.P.Q. 249 (6th Cir 1977).
335 See, e.g., Schering Corp v. Roussel-UCLAF SA, 104 F3d 341, 41 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1359 (Fed Cir
1997); Israel Bioengineering Project v. Amgen Inc., 81 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 2007). A refusal to
join in suit against an infringer can result in the de facto grant of a license even without positive
action. See STC.UNM v. Intel Corp., No. 13-1241 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
336 Boaz, supra note 308, at 87. These include Jeremy Bentham and the economist Ludwig von
Mises. Id. at 82-83.
333
334
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article sets out to examine if, in light of the development innovation
production theories have undergone, the patent system still achieves its goal. The
Patent Act is a means to a socially desired end. To encourage innovation, the state
grants the inventor a monopoly right to manufacture, use, and sell his creation. The
research question is examined in light of the change in the innovator's image—from
an individual to an innovative entity. To answer this question, the article takes us
back in time to pre-legislation England, through American colonies and the federal
enactment of the U.S. Patent Act, including the arguments in support of inventors'
private rights.
The legal and theoretical basis for the patent system was established by the
seventeenth century English common-law Courts and Parliament, in the midst of their
successful struggle against monopolies, following the indiscriminate use of letters
patent mainly by Queen Elizabeth I. Such grants were forbidden on the grounds that
they suppressed that freedom of trade which was “the birthright of every subject.”337
The establishment of the American federal patent system gave rise to the image of the
heroic inventor. The patent system itself perpetuates and reifies the myth of the
individual inventor.338 With the establishment of the federal system, the patentee was
no longer the craftsman who practices his skills, but the intellectual inventor who
creates and discloses information. 339 The development of civil rights, property rights,
justifications based on the natural rights, and Lockean perspectives, led to the rise of
a new framework: the inventors as owners vision. This framework was manifested in
the federal patent system. The patent system provides these genius individuals,
creating new ideas, control over their informational output in the form of ownership. 340
The mechanism by which the patent system achieves its policy objectives, to foster and
incentivize invention and innovation, is through the allocation of private property
rights to individuals. The patent system is concerned with identifying the individual
inventor, or patentee, to whom it can assign exclusive rights. 341
Innovation has become the central driver of national and global economic wellbeing and the competitiveness of nations. 342 This is particularly true with the
emergence of the knowledge-based economy. While the patent system remained
focused on the individual, the twentieth century brought along winds of change to
innovation production theories. Innovation theories recognized the importance of
collaboration to the innovation process. It however became the focal point of
innovation theories only during 1980s. 343
The Acts' view of innovation, as an individual endeavor, is based on the fourteenth
century identity of the privilege grantee. The fact that views from five centuries ago
337 Alfred E. Kahn, Fundamental Deficiencies of the American Patent Law, 30 AM. ECON. REV.
475, 476 (1940). See supra, Part II.A
338 Lee, supra note 151, at 27.
339 Bracha (2009), supra note 14, at 374.
340 Id.
341 Lee, supra note 151, at 27.
342 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), The Measurement
of Scientific and Technological Activities: Using Patent Data as Science and Technology Indicators 11
(1994), available at: http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/2095942.pdf.
343 See, e.g., Marinova & Phillimore, supra note 193, for a comprehensive review of the theories.
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still shape policymakers’ way of thinking about innovation in the twentieth century
raises concerns. The risk is that the main tool used to foster innovation may not do so
as effectively as before, as it ignores the emergence of the innovative entity. The
sections of the Act that are seemingly designed to attain the need to incentivize the
establishment of an innovative entity denote a libertarian property regime which does
not sit with the fact that the innovative entity is actually a net of cross-organizational
collaborations. Libertarians' view of property is of self-ownership. Other forms of
ownership are not accepted.344 “The U.S. patent laws, which are designed to promote
innovation, should facilitate and not hinder the vehicles for progress, such
as . . . collaboration. With these principles in mind, the question of the impact of
patent protection on collaborative behavior warrants a closer scrutiny of the law
governing inventorship.”345
The Act only applies to situations in which the partners do not have a prior
agreement that dictates the relationship between them. 346 Nevertheless, the
importance of the discussion stems from the simple fact that not every interaction is
governed by an agreement between partners working jointly, though usually people
assume so. More importantly, as the patent system is the main policy tool used to
advance innovation, it serves as an instrument by policymakers to signal actors
operating in the innovation ecosystem of policymakers' state-of-mind which are the
measures that should be taken to foster innovation. 347 I maintain that though
policymakers try to signal that collaborations are needed to generate more innovation,
under the current Act it is done inadequately. 348 The lack of appropriate signal also
stems from the distinction between ‘collaboration’ and ‘joint work,’ or ‘joint activities.’
This is an important distinction as sections 116 and 262 refer to a joint activity not
collaboration. Joint activities vary, and collaboration is one of them. Unlike other
joint activities, collaboration requires higher levels of partners' commitment. As
collaboration is the joint activity we wish to foster, policymakers should address the
meaning of collaboration and the difference between collaboration and other joint
activities within the Patent Act. Policymakers should also strive to incentivize the
initiation of cross-organizational collaborations and the establishment of an innovative
entity aimed at developing inventions and innovations. The Act should adopt a

344 Ravi Iyer, et al., Understanding Libertarian Morality: The psychological roots of an
individualist
ideology,
7
PLOS
ONE
1,
16-7
(2012),
https://webfiles.uci.edu/phditto/peterditto/Publications/Iyer%20et%20al%202012.pdf (Reaching the
conclusion that libertarians are individualistic and are less prone to support the initiation of
collaboration based on a large web-based survey of libertarians).
345 Sung, supra note 242, at 422.
346 CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 300, at 16 (“Given the ability of joint researchers to
“contract around” the patent statute’s inventorship standards, changes to current rules may not be a
high priority for Congress”).
347 W. Fritz Fasse, The Muddy Metaphysics of Joint Inventorship: Cleaning Up After the 1984
Amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 116, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 207 (“Because a mutual exchange of ideas
and information among inventors results in increased aggregate innovation, a collaboration
requirement of this nature serves to further a fundamental policy goal of the patent laws.”).
348 For empirical evidence of the innovative powers of cross-organizational collaborations, see
Ponchek (2016), supra note 5.
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standard349 of collaboration that will incorporate the high levels of commitment
between the partners to the common mission, through pooling and jointly securing
resources, shared rewards and products. 350 “[T]o achieve the goal of maximum
innovation, the patent system should foster actual collaboration among researchers.
This collaboration will lead to more joint inventive work and the development of more
patentable inventions.”351 To do so, and in order to catch up with innovation production
theories, the Act should address the issue of joint ownership, and set a clear rule that
takes into account the non-specific nature of the joint inventorship that leads to an
inclusive joint ownership right.352 If the patent system does not succeed in achieving
its goal, actors operating in the innovation ecosystem may opt to use (to use to a greater
extent than they have been doing so far) trade secrets. The main problem of trade
secrets is they “do not enrich the collective knowledge of society.” 353 This means that
society at large would be on the losing side, and the rate of innovation production would
slow down, as secrecy and collaboration do not sit together.

349 Sung, supra note 242, at 420 (“the degree of such collegiality [such as collaboration] rests upon
the ability of members of these communities to agree and adhere to recognizable standards of conduct
that promote collaborative behavior.”).
350 See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
351 Fasse, supra note 347, at 159-60.
352 But cf. Tigran Guledjian, Teaching the Federal Circuit New Tricks: Updating the Law of Joint
Inventorship in Patents, 32 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 1273, 1299 (1999) (concluding that only fractionating
the patent into its claims produces the most equitable outcome for joint inventors.); and CRS REPORT
FOR CONGRESS, supra note 300, at 19-20.
353 CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 300, at 5.

